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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this case'under Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). The Supreme Court is authorized to transfer this appeal to the
Court of Appeals under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4). The Court of Appeals has
appellate jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
i

?

Because Jacob Christensen is dissatisfied with Haynes' Statement of Issues, it
presents the following statement of the issues presented on appeal and on cross-appeal:
Issues on Appeal
1.

When a court determines that a road has been dedicated to the public

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104, but the issue of width is not the focus of the
litigation, is it proper for the court to allow the authorities of the state, counties, or
municipalities to determine the reasonable and necessary width of the road pursuant to
the authority granted them under Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-108?
Standard of review. A determination of the district court which relies upon
statutory interpretation is reviewed for correctness. Selrnan, Inc. v. Box Elder County,
2009 UT App 99, ^j 3, 208 P.3d 535.
2.

Did the trial court err in not quieting title to portions of Haynes' property

that were not in dispute?
1

"Jacob Christensen" refers to Appellees and Cross Appellants Jacob Family Chalk
Creek LLC, Catherine B. Christensen, L.L.C., and Brian Garff.
"Haynes" refers to Appellants and Cross Appellees Haynes Land & Livestock Company
and Triple H. Ranch, LC.
1
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Standard of review. In equity cases appellate courts review the record to
determine whether the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings of the trial
court. The findings should not be disturbed unless the clear weight of the evidence is
against them. Merrill v. Bailey and Son, 99 Utah 323, 331, 106 P.2d 255 (Utah 1940)
(citations omitted).
3.

Is the reasonable and necessary width of a road dedicated to the public

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 limited to the beaten path of the road as it
currently exists?
Standard of review. A determination of the reasonable and necessary
"width of the [public] highway presents a question of fact." Accordingly, the trial
court's determinations are reviewed for clear error. Town of Leeds v. Prisbrey,
2008 UT 11,^5, 179P.3d757.
4.

Was the evidence of public use of the Road sufficient for the Court to

determine that the RoadJ was dedicated to the public pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5104?
Standard of review.
We review the trial court's legal interpretation of the Dedication Statute for
correctness and its factual finding for clear error. But whether the facts of a
case satisfy the requirements of the Dedication Statute is a mixed question
of fact and law that involves various and complex facts, evidentiary
resolutions, and credibility determinations. Thus we review the trial court's
decision regarding whether a public highway has been established under

3

The Road, in general, refers to the loop is represented in red on Trial Exhibit 117, a
large color copy of which is submitted herewith at Appendix "D". [See also Appendix
"E" attached hereto that identifies points of interest on Trial Ex. 117.]
2
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[the Dedication Statute].. .for correctness but grant the court significant
discretion in its application of the facts to the statute.
Jennings Investment, LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 119, U 5, 208 P.3d
1077 (citing Town of Leeds v. Prisbrey, 2008 UT 11, U 5, 179 P.3d 757).
Issues on Cross Appeal
5.

Did the trial court err in failing to find that the Road was dedicated to the

public through Section 34 of Range 8 of Township 2?
Standard of review. See standard of review for Issue No. 4, above.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104:
(1)
A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when
it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period often
years.
(2)
The dedication and abandonment creates a right-of-way held by the
state in accordance with Sections 72-3-102, 72-3-104, 72-5-1-5, and 72-5103.
(3)
The scope of the right-of-way is that which is reasonable and
necessary to ensure safe travel according to the facts and circumstances.
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-108:
The width of rights-of-way for public highways shall be set as the highway
authorities of the state, counties, or municipalities may determine for the
highways under the respective jurisdiction.
STATEMENT

OF THE CASE

Less than 20 years after Brigham Young first said, 'This is the right place,"
settlers created a road in the Uinta Mountains in an area known as the East Fork of the
Chalk Creek. This Road was used by loggers to haul trees to sawmills, it was used by
church groups for recreational outings, it was used by homesteaders to reach their cabins,
3
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it was used by hunters, it was used by tens of thousands of sheep and their shepherds, and
it was used by families and scout troops to go to the picturesque Blue Lakes for fishing.
As a result of the continuous public use which created and expanded the Road, maps of
the area reflected its path as early as 1875. The Road has been on maps ever since,
including a Summit County Map exactly 100 years later, which indicates the Road is
public.
The land surrounding that Road was originally owned by the Federal Government
and the railroad, and later passed into private hands. The Boyers4 acquired their land
around the Blue Lakes in 1905. The Jacob/Christensen families acquired over 9,000
acres in 1941, and the Haynes family also completed its acquisition of over 9,000 acres in
1941. Without a doubt, the public Road was there first. These three families used the
Road to access their property, to build cabins, and to travel to the Blue Lakes for fishing.
Unfortunately, one of these families was not like the others. The Haynes family
tried to control use of this public Road. As Haynes concedes its brief: "The minutes of
the Summit County commissioners for September 2, 1947, state that the fish and game
warden 'asked that an investigation be made as to the status of the Road through Howard
Haynes Property, and leading to Blue Lake, as Mr. Haynes had closed the road to the
public and the same had generally been used by the public for a long time." [Haynes
Brief at 43.]

4

"Boyer" refers to Appellees and Cross Appellants Fern J. Boyer, Gerald G. Boyer,
Gregory J. Boyer, J.S. Hansen, Alfred C. Blongquist.
4
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Haynes5 misguided crusade to control the public Road continues. In 1998,
Haynes filed this lawsuit to restrict or eliminate use of the Road by the Boyer and JacobChristensen families. Discovery went on for years, and finally the case was tried last
year. The trial court concluded that the evidence was "overwhelming" that the Road is
public. Following this convincing defeat, Haynes adopted a new approach - to restrict
use of the Road by forcing a potentially unsafe road width determination. However, the
trial court was unable to make a reasonable decision on the width of the Road following
trial because precious little evidence had been presented on road width during trial.
Simply put, road width was not an issue at trial. The trial court initially hazarded a posttrial guess at 18 feet, without indicating whether that width was the traveled way, was to
include shoulders to allow two-way traffic to safely pass, and so forth. However, the
Court later withdrew that incomplete finding as early thinking and non-binding dicta.
This later ruling is not appropriately mentioned by Haynes in its Brief.
Rather than making a factual determination of road width without the facts, the
trial court properly requested that Summit County exercise its statutory duty to
investigate and determine an appropriate width of the Road, which it did. Summit
County determined, based on safety and other considerations, that the Road is 36 feet
wide. This ruling equally impacts the Haynes and the Jacob-Christensen families,
because the public Road crosses both of their land.
Unsatisfied with its efforts to cut-off or limit access to the Jacob-Christensen and
Boyer family land, Haynes now asks this Court to reverse the trial court's rulings on road
width and even on the intensely factual judicial finding that the Road is public. This
5
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Court should affirm the trial court's rulings on road width and with respect to the Road
being public. In addition, the Court should modify the trial court's ruling in one respect - determining that the Road extends to the Blue Lakes. The evidence presented at trial
was undisputed that the public used the Road to get to the Blue Lakes for fishing. An
extension of the trial court's ruling regarding the length of the public Road would restore
access to the Boyer family to property that it has owned for generations. The Boyer
family addresses this issue in its brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Orientation of the Properties and the Road.
Haynes owns approximately 9,574 acres of real property along or close to the East
Fork of Chalk Creek in Summit County. [H.R.000002, f 6 (Exhibit A) (the "Haynes
Property").] Jacob-Christensen also owns approximately 9,346 acres of real property,
which adjoins the Haynes Property both on the south and west borders of the Haynes
property. [H.R. 000002, If 6 (Exhibit B) (the "Jacob-Christensen Property").]
The Road at issue in this Lawsuit consists of a loop providing Jacob Christensen
and Boyer access to their respective properties over land owned by Haynes. This loop is
represented in Trial Exhibit 117. The trial court broke down the Road into different
segments. [H.R. 001406, p. 14, ^J 5.] The first segment of the road departs from
Highway 133 ("Chalk Creek Canyon Road") and travels in a southerly direction until it
reaches Jacob Christensen property (the "Bench Road"). [Id.; see also Trial Ex. 117
(Haynes' portion of Segment A).] The first quarter mile of the Bench Road crosses over
land owned by the EJinghams and the remainder, over land owned by the Haynes. [Id.]
6
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Once it reaches Jacob Christensen property, it travels in a southern and easterly direction
until it reaches the Boyer property (the "Middle Fork Road"). [H.R. 001406-001407, pp.
14-15, Tj 5; see also, Trial Ex. 117 (Jacob Christensen portion of Segment A and segment
C).] There is a fork in the Bench Road located on the Haynes property at the northwest
corner of Section 7, Range 8, Township 2, which travels in an easterly and somewhat
southerly direction. [H.R. 001407, p. 15, If 6; Trial Ex. 117 (Segments B & D).] The
Road then turns south over Haynes' property through Sections 15, 22, 23, 25, and
portions of Section 27 of Range 8, Township 2 until it reaches the Jacob Christensen
property, due north of Joyce Lake. [H.R. 001407, p. 15, ^f 6; Trial Ex. 117 (Segment D
on Haynes' property).] The Road then travels the east side of Joyce Lake on Jacob
Christensen property until it reaches the Boyer property at the north end of Section 34,
Rage 8, Township 2. [Id.; Trial Exhibit 117.] The Road then crosses the Boyer property
(the "Boyer Road"), travels across the reservoir, then travels to Jacob Christensen's
property once more, completing the loop in the center of Section 34 of Range 8,
Township 2, near the southern end of the Boyer Reservoir. [H.R. 001407-1408, pp. 1516,1|6.]
2. Existence of the Road.
According to official government documents, the Bench Road, Middle Fork Road,
and the East Fork Road (to approximately the center of Township 2, Range 8, Section 8)
portions of the Road have existed for over 100 years. [Trial Ex. 108; Trial Ex. 109; Trial
Ex. I l l ; Trial Ex. 112.] In 1875, the United States surveyed the lands over which the
first two miles of the Bench Road are located. [Trial Ex. 101.] This survey shows the
7
299473v2

road described as "road to sawmill" leaving Highway 133 and extending to the south of
section 1 of township 2N Range 7 East. [Trial Ex. 101, p. 36.] The remaining lands in
which the Bench Road, Middle Fork Road, and the first portion of the East Fork Road are
located were surveyed in 1893. [Trial Ex. 103; Trial Ex. 111.] The surveys show that by
1893 the entire Bench Road had been established and the Middle Fork Road extended
south all the way to Section 4 of Township 1 North, Range 8 East. [See Trial Ex. 103;
104; 105, pp. 400, 419, 425, 428-29, 432-33, 438-40, 443; 111 and 112.] Further, a
1900 U.S. Geological Survey map shows the Middle Fork Road extending through into
what is marked as Segment C on Exhibit 117. [Trial Ex. 113; 117.]
3. Use of the Road.
A. Presence of Sawmills and Timbering Activity Along the Road.
There is evidence of sawmill and timbering activity along the first couple miles of
the Bench Road as early as 1865. Specifically, in 1865 the probate court granted the
petition of L.L. Randall, Jacob Huffman (and two others) to saw timber on Chalk Creek
Canyon. [Trial Ex. 131.] Historical records establish that the referenced sawmill was
located approximately two miles up the east fork of Chalk Creek. [Trial Ex. 137, p. 139
('The men who first owned these mills were as follows: L.L. Randall owning a saw mill
about two miles up from Pine Cliff, in the East Fork of Calk [sic] Creek."); Trial Ex. 158,
p. 9; Trial Ex. 101, p. 36; 108.] Further, a 1874 map of the Territory of Utah [Trial
Ex.163], a 1875 Mineral Map of Utah [Trial Ex.164] and a 1878 Mineral Map of Utah
[Trial Ex. 165] also show the existence of a saw mill in this vicinity. This mill was

8
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operated for many years and supplied timber to the local communities. [Trial Ex. 158, p.
9-]
In addition, the record shows another sawmill, owned by Merritt Staley, was
located "way up the East Fork where the ledges are." [Trial Ex. 159, p. 3.] This sawmill
was in existence at least by 1886 because a newspaper reported diptheria spread through
Merritt Staley's family in 1886 while the family was living at Staley's "saw mill in the
mountains." [Trial Ex. 146; Trial Ex. 147.] It operated for at least four years as at least
one record shows it was still operating in 1890. [Trial Ex. 159, pp. 2-3.]
In 1893, a United States surveyor reported seeing two old sawmills located along
or close to the Road. [Trial Ex. 105, pp. at 431, 440.] One of the sawmills was located
close to the Road at Point I, and the other was located along the Road at Point A. [Id.;
Trial Ex. 117.] Shirley Macfarlane, the daughter of Howard Haynes, testified that the
remains of a sawmill in Section 7 were present from her earliest recollection. [Trial Tr.
Vol. Ill, p. 733:11-25.]
The record also shows individual members of the public cut down and hauled
away timber from the land adjacent to the Road. Fern Boyer and Robert Powell, born in
1928 and 1929, respectively, testified that in their youths they recalled their families
using the Road to cut wood for fire wood, fence posts, etc. [Trial Tr. Vol. II, pp. 422:1722, 424:19-426:1, 428:19-22 ; Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 484:3-21.] Gwennola Blonquist, born
in 1912, testified that people used to use the road to go up to a sawmill to obtain lumber.
[G. Blonquist Depo, p. 13:2-16; admitted at Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 556.]

9
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B. Grazing and Trailing of Livestock Along the Road.
Sheep herds constituted another portion of the public that used the Road.
According to several homestead records, individuals also settled along the Road for
purposes of farming, grazing, and sheep herding. [See e.g., Trial Ex. 120, pp. JC 1546—
47; Trial Ex. 119, pp. JC 1572-73.]
A good portion of the Jacob-Christensen property and part of the Haynes property
are enclaves within the boundaries of the forest where the sheep were grazed and trailed
into other forest land or parts of Wyoming. [Trial Ex. 117; Trial Ex. 149, p. 8; Trial Ex.
157, p. 7 , in App. II, Tab 28; Deposition of Lloyd ("Collard Depo."), p. 18, admitted at
Trial Tr. Vol. IV, p. 874.]
The number of sheep moved specifically along the East Fork of Chalk Creek can
be partially measured by information about shearing and dipping corrals in the area. The
"Clark Brothers . . . built the first shearing corral, which served thousands of sheep for
many years." [Trial Ex. 137, p. at 143.] In 1890, the Deseret News reported that a sheep
herder who was herding "Church sheep, and was camped near Bishop Clark's shearing
corral on Mill Fork of Chalk Creek, is lost." [Trial Ex. 148, p. 494.] Mill Fork of Chalk
Creek connects to the Road in Section 20, Township 2 North, Range 8 East, [Trial Ex.
117], and is shown as extending into and stopping at a corral indicated as Point L on Trial
Ex. 117. [Trial Ex. 117, Point L; Trial Ex. 110.]
In 1893, a United States surveyor reported that John Clark had a dipping corral
located along Segment A of the Road (ccPoint J"). [Trail Ex. 117; Trial Ex. 105, pp. 431,
447.] In 1895, an article in the Coalville Times reported that 40,000 sheep had been
10
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dipped already at Clark's corral that seasoii, and that by the end of the season tlicy
expected to dip 100.000 sheep. [Trial Fx. 150. p. i ! \ yeai later, another article
reponcd inai o\ v.i

- ' o . , , . ^ . . ^ i . ' . . .,pi c-i ..

;a * .-. ^ •.-•rial m i <v;<> '•

: F\

151., |: 1 1 Clai k's dippii lg corral coi itii n led operations at ICUM UU uugii 1898. [See, e.g.,
1 rial Ex. 152, p. E]
C.

Homes and Farms.

Aloi lg witl ) tl lese h\ isiness acti1 nik s, 1: :»y appi oxii i lately I 882 people begai I
building homes, corrals, ditches, and fences along or close to the Road. [rfrial Ex. 119,
pp. JC 1570- 72: Trial Ex. 120. pp. JC 1542. 1544 46.]
I
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*
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•

>

.

.

'

!
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l
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*

Township 2 North, Range 8 Ea^L thiough winch Segment A of the Road passes (/Tomt
E"). JTrialEx. 1 E 7 -Trial F \ 1 19. pp JCl^wO 77.; I E luiili .-. Imuso. corrals, and a
:

^UHMe. and itNcu ihe property for grazing ana kinning. | :. i;;- !
vV. oialex did n o t iiic his E n n c s l r a d en'

n\e\v:

:/ -

'•'.>'

•'•

]

• i

1559, 1562.J Thus. I "or more ihan ten years he used and occupied die land w ilia >ui license
or permission from die Iccicral government. A liomestead patent was issued lo W Staley

Leonard W Randall ("*1 \\ . Randall") began occupy inu land along Segment A of
Tic l\---ad between !882 and i;-.;E' m i.ie same location a^ die "Randall"" cabm i^^niilied
of i Si ii vcy Plat« I ("I- 'oil .t I ; ")• |' I. i i; il Ex. 117: Trial E

112; I i i. ii E::? : 120, j >p JC 1542,

1544 46.j 1 le built a house, corrals, ditches, and fences, and used the property for
grazing and farming. [Trial Ex. l n 0 . pp. ] ^ 17 1 Ml- 16 ] \ :<uv\r\ plat map aEo noted
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the location of an irrigated field in the area ("Point G"). [Trial Ex. 117; Trial Ex. 112;
see also Trial Ex. 129.] In 1896, L.W. Randall first filed his homestead entry, again more
than ten years after he began to use and occupy the land without license or permission.
[Trial Ex. 120, pp. JC 1537, 1540.] A homestead patent was issued to L.W. Randall in
1903 for the 160-acre parcel. [Trial Ex. 120, p. JC 1558.]
Between 1893 and 1896, two other individuals began occupying land in Section 8,
Township 2 North, Range 8 East, along Segment B of the Road, for purposes of
establishing a homestead. [Trial Ex. 121, pp. JC 2347-48; Trial Ex. 122, pp. JC 232728; Trial Ex. 117.]
George Huff settled on land in Section 8, Township 2 North, Range 8 East, in
December 1893, and established his actual residence a year later ("Point B"). [Trial Ex.
117; Trial Ex. 121, pp. JC 2337, 2347.] In addition to building a home, he built a stable,
corrals, and fencing. [Trial Ex. 121, pp. 2345-47.] He also cleared and cultivated part of
the land. [Trial Ex. 121, pp. 2345-47; see also Trial Ex. 130.] Similar to W. Staley and
L.W. Randall, Huff did not immediately file his homestead entry, but waited two years,
filing in December 1895. [Trial Ex. 121, p. JC 2337.] A homestead patent was issued to
Huff in 1901 for the 160-acre parcel. [Trial Ex. 121, p. 2351.]
In 1896, Charles Saxton also filed his homestead entry in Section 8, Township 2
North, Range 8 East ("Point C")- [Trial Ex., 122, p. JC 2314; Trial Ex. 117.] He built a
house, corrals, fencing, and ditches. [Trial Ex. 122, pp. JC 2325-27.] He cultivated
some of the land, and indicated it was good for grazing. [Trial Ex. 122, pp. JC 2325-27.]
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A homestead patent w a s issued to Saxton iii 1903 for the 160-acre parcel. [1 rial Ex. 122,
p. IC 2333.]
Ai I 1893 Government Survey re lit a., lunher use oi me rauid r \ nui.iiL ....-a

mile Horn the fluff and Saxion homesteads ("Point I)"i. : i r:al l ; x. 1 12; Trial 1 A . I 1 |
•\ lilin cai-in was located at h u n t ! I near ihc Ko.r- ' ; ;;.i. i ^ : :

: \; i. I x •

.]

Tl: ii.!: ; is til s same sectioi i in i : vl: licl i ( 2!a::i: k ' s dippii ig cc i :t: a! ai id ai I old sa vv i nill \\ e:t :::: local: ::: • ::! ,
w h i c h section r e m a i n e d in federal o w n e r s h i p until 18yy. L i i i a i L x . 112.J N o tiocumeiits
show grant of title, license, or permission h\ the federal government for a m person o

during the relevant lime period oi 1880 to 1890. [ i iial Lx. 107.J
According to government records from 1893, Segmei it A of the Road, ended at a
sixth caf.ii lO^ju w .ii Section >. I vi\\ nsiup . m ii.i. Kam.-e *a i'a.-a i ;"•. ,.ii
1
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'•'

' . , • - .
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J
* :•

: r-^i : ••:.
• i^;

y

ihc federal g o v e r n m e n t iW a m person or entity to f mid a n d use the cabin uii the property
either b e i o r e or m a m g the r e ! e \ a n t time p c n o d oi : > S o > " ' *-'l*/> ; S W ' T r i a l E x . 1 0 6 . ]
tesen }oir s i inc / Wt iter I diversion
in January 1903, a Notice of Appropriation of Water w a s filed for the dual
purpose of establishing a reservoir in Section 34, Township 2 North, Range 8 East, 7 and
divet tii :ig tl :ie watei to I Ipt< ::):i I a t id Coal < > ill :: , [' I i ial 123, p. 560.] 1 1 K • v /ate i >, • as i leeded ii i
Section 3 4 o f T o w n s h i p 2 I\VHLII. Nange 8 1 £ IM. f> mv current location oi . m i <H i U Water
U s e r s ' r e s e r v o i r s , a n d is ;i Motion i h m u p h whirl- \br >'oa.d passed
ITi-inf ! » \\" ; l »wjng
location of Boyer Lake).]
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Upton and Coalville for "irrigation purposes, domes [tic] purposes, and other useful
purposes." [Trial Ex. 123, p. 560.]
E.

Hunting and Fishing

The Road also provided access for recreational activities in and aropnd the East
Fork of Chalk Creek, such as hunting and fishing. [Trail Ex. 139, pp. 10-11; 9 Trial Tr.
Vol. II, p. 428:10-22.] In 1899, the Coalville Times reported that people were hunting
and killing bear in the vicinity of "East Fork Creek." [Trial Ex. 154, p. 1; see also Trial
Ex. 153, p. 1.] Red Hole, which is accessed through Segment A of the Road as it
traverses through Section 18, "was a natural haunt for bear and a very popular hunting
ground." [Trial Ex. 139, p. 26; Trial Ex. 117 (showing location of Red Hole); see also
Trial Tr. Vol. II, pp. 425:23-426:8.]
Gwennola Blonquist, born in 1912, testified she went to the Blue Lakes using the
Middle Fork Road twice in 1933 with her husband and several other "yahoos" to hike and
recreate. [Gwennola Blonquist Depo., pp. 10:24-11:8, admitted at Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, p.
556; see also, Trial Ex. 262 (photographs of Ms. Blonquist at the Boyer Reservoir).]
During the trial, C. Kay Crittenden, born 1923, testified that he had gone up to the
Blue Lakes and fished and camped on numerous occasions prior to 1935 and never saw
any gates, signs, or any other obstruction preventing the public at large from travelling
along the Road. [Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 502:5-504:18.]

9

Sam Banner Jr. lived in the Chalk Creek area from approximately 1893 to 1908. [Trial Ex. 139,
pp. 1,9,31-32.]
14
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During the trial, Fern Boyer, born in 1928, testified that her lather (and others)
used to go to the Blue Fakes to fish "all (he lime." [Trial 'IV Vol. II. pp - 1 - : F F 4 ^ : Q ]
A .ii.iir.iK; ui pn-.-iograpns were a iimueo »*i .eo:. *
:Mhi^ Mh . ! -tk

!

•..»,:•

,

:;,,i

r. ; • "1 hin-

.")

die l y i ^ b uineliaine. [ i rial Fx. 261 .J She testified she would go up

a> ihe Blue I akes annuailx in die lc>30s for iwo weeks at a time \* iih her grandparents to
camp. flsn and ML tini.-u. | i * i i . :

M

vp

!

.

* . .• ,

A l"()i i :r lei t esi( lei il of; I Ipton, R obert 1 'owell, 1: oi i i in 1929 testified on oi :ie occasioi i
that he and his cousiii drove part way up tlre Middle Fork Road, parked and walked to ihe
Mine Fakes. In fact, nn the way down he testified they encountered the local fish warden

Lamont Slaley testified that in 1939 at the age ol \2 his scoutmaster took him and
his scout troop camping to the Blue Lakes for four or fi\ e da\ s. [Deposition of I.amorit
Male).

;

..

.::...

..;• .

Finally, the biuL'.nnlu oi Mvrtle R i g b \ , a lady homesteader, states:
Sundays were especiaih sun ami exciting at Chalk Creek Ranch in the Summer.
More frequently than not there were eii\ \isitors. A bountiful lunch was prepared,
favorite horses were saddled, a team harnessed - and e \ e r \ o n e was off to Blue
Fake or Bear River to fish.
[ 1 rial Ex. 160, p. 6.]

F.

Socials and Dances

Social e\ ei its like dai ices also oca n i ed ii I tl :ie ai ea

" J / I K n I a dai ice w as scl iedi lied

[in Upton during the late 1800s], the word traveled far. The men and women at the
sawmills high in tlle hills heard of it and e\en those herding sheep around and abo\e ihe
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sawmills" came. [Trial Ex. 142, p. at 31.] By 1891, an amusement hall was built in
Upton. [Trial Ex. 137, p. 143; Trial Ex. 139, p. 7; Trial Tr. Vol., II, p. 435:10-17.]
G.

Federal Ownership of the Land in Dispute

The United States retained ownership of every even-numbered section through
which Segments A and B of the Road traverse until approximately 1896. [See, e.g., Trial
Ex. 119, p. JC 1559 (stating that homestead entry for section 18 was filed December 26,
1895); Trial Ex. 120, p. JC 1537; Trial Ex. 121, p. JC 2338; Trial Ex. 122, p. JC 2314.]
Odd sections of land along Segments A and B of the Road transferred to the Union
Pacific Railroad on January 8, 1869. [Trial Ex. 127; 12 Stat. 489, § 3; Trial Ex. 132, p.
516.] A table attached hereto as Appendix "F" details when each section along Segments
A and B of the Road passed from federal ownership. [See also, Trial Ex. 128.]
H. Public Acknowledgments of Road Status.
The importance of canyon roads, such as the Road at issue in this Lawsuit, to the
local communities they served is shown by the 1894 minutes of the probate court. These
minutes reflect that the "[p]rosecuting attorney was instructed to forbid any person or
persons from closing any of the canyon roads in Summit County that have beefn used as
public highways for seven years and to prosecute any person violating the instructions
herein given." [Trial Ex. S.C. 243.] Further, the minutes of the Summit County
Commission show that in 1913 the county expended monies for road work on Sage Brush
Flats which constitutes part of the Bench Road. [Trial Ex. S.C. 244.] In 1918, the road is
set forth on the Summit County Map and in 1975 the entirety of the road including the
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loop is designated as a Class D iuau on Surnn lit Com lty's general highway map. [""'1 rial
Ex. 166. Trial F \

*

I a; m*er. Cwemhaa j>io;upiis:. AOI si ;;: : v i 1. icsiiiicu ;m.; - nui me\ used 11 ic KoaU
IU Lia\el LU the :' :.- I akc-; i!v k li.-\ ••.:

= !-, n .d . W ;v .

people that usee! ;he Road. jG. Blonquisi ! kpo

'-

\\

•... •

p i ••" '- \ . rem Mover testified thai

the community was shocked ^ mi • mw.nd ! Tavnes. Sr. bulked off access \ la the Road in
aboi it 19' 1 7 given 1,1 lat it 1 ladi i t bt :er i etc: s< : ; i • : iTpi ic it ai id. ai lyor ic ii vas ii ee to travel i ipon
... , I rial Tr. Vol. i f p p . \ 10:1 / - T k . ^ l . j S m i i l a r l ) . Robert Powell testified thai prior to
1950. it w a s his belief that t h e e o m m u n i t v viewed it as a public road. (Trial Ti Vol III,
. .•-(••

. i•

^vrri in 1 v 1 * -.

. -.id !<\: • d

. .\ -. *

restrictions on access along the Road until tlic late 1940s or early 1950s and the public
was free to traverse across it. [Trial Ti

V

T HI. pp. 507:22-509:12.]

in I'uiiug on luu ioeai issue ol the La • .m! ;!

• .•.;:••.

,5

• •'• '-

o

was public pursuant m \ uah Code Ann. y "" !-5-l()4. 1 low ever, because the width olThe
Road was not the locus ol UK nimaliom lac mal court was not in a position to decide its

litigation, the trial cour; -ilih/cd its sound discretion to allow Summit Count}', winch has
the autlioiil) dial (he expertise to determine die width of public roads within its
•

'

; . 1.

According to Haynes, however, only a court can declare that a road has been
dedicated to the public pursuant to § 72-5-104. a proposition not found in or supported by
17
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the plain language of the statute. Similarly, Haynes asserts that if a court does determine
that a road has been dedicated to the public pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104, it
must make a determination of width or simply leave the width of the road in its existing
"beaten path" condition. The former alternative has been expressly rejected by the Utah
Supreme Court in Butler, Crockett and Walsh Development Corporation v. Pinecrest.
Pipeline Operating, Co., 909 P.2d 225, 232 (Utah 1995) (holding that "it was not error
for the district court to refuse to determine the width of the road when that issue was not
the focus of the litigation"). The latter alternative is unsupportable as a determination of
width is necessary to provide a complete remedy and to ensure the safe and convenient
travel of the public over public roads - a task specifically delegated to county authorities
by the legislature. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(3), 108; Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 116
P.2d 420 (Utah 1941).
Haynes also asserts that it is entitled to a ruling quieting the title to any potential
claim against its property, past, present, future, known or unknown. This request is
incredibly overbroad as well as untimely. The scope of a quiet title action is dictated by
the challenges made to the title of the property owner. Utah State Department of Social
Services v. Santiago, 590 P.2d 335, 337 (Utah 1979); Malualani B. Hoopiiana Trust v.
Hoopiiana, 206 UT 53 \ 26. Accordingly, a party seeking to quiet title is not entitled to a
determination regarding potential or speculative claims against the property, but only
present claims or challenges against it. See id. The dispute in this Lawsuit was access
across the Road. No other claims were asserted. Accordingly, the trial was correct in
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refusing to rule that Ilaynes is entitled to quiet title lor any issues other thai1 as litigated
V !he Lawsuit.
i iaynes also makes nan iicarieu attempt u> v.iaiicnue u.c ^mnciency of the trial
cert u: t's findii lgs tl iat poi tioi is of tl le R oad w ere dedicated to the pi iblic pi irsi lai it to I Jtal 1
Code Ann. vj 72-5-11>4. I laynes" assertions are unfounded given ihc "V\cn\ helming"
evidence that llic j-unnL u^a: inc HciiL.it Road .md MIOUK K<rk Kuad consistently,

obligations to adcquaiel) marshal die c\ idenee and the trial court's determinations should
he upheld This is particularly so given the level of deference afforded to a trial court's
ueu..

•-:.-• .

..' •.

-fe

: v-. .-i-

Aliui

MKN f

THE TRIAI , COURT WAS CORR E C ! IN LEAVING THE
DETERMINATION OF ROAD WIDTH TO SUMMIT COUNTY
\, HAYNES HAS ENTIRELY FAILED TO MARSHAL THE FVIOENCE
SU PPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS.
Ilaynes ecu i lpletely iV

*

•

- i < L - » • -; ^ ••• < • •<

'r-\

]I

-i • !l.

•

t

doing, Haynes disregards the express requirement (hat an appellant challenging the
iindii:j..> ol tiie li'uii v.ourt mii^t ""hrsi li-i

:

iiiv. c\ idenee supporting the chaiiuiged

findii lg. tliei i si IOV ' tl iat tl le i i mi si laled evider ice is legalb ; ii ISI lfficiei it to si ippoi 1 tl ic
findings when viewing the evidence and inferences in light most favorable to the
decision." AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 2005 I IT App 168, f 9, 112 P.3d 1228 (citing
Ting ey v. ChrisU mst w, 1999 t I I ' 69,1 | ' / , 1 % I Jtal i 68, 98 71 \2d 588) (en lpl u isis; ide lei !/; ;
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see also, Harding v. Bell, 2002 UT 108, U 19, 57 P.3d 1093 (citations omitted) (holding
that a party challenging a finding or verdict must "assume the role of 'devil's
advocate.'").
Indeed, it is the duty of the Appellant to "present 'every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists' and
then 'ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence.'" T.K v. R.C. (In re E.H.), 2006 UT 36, f
64, 137 P.3d 809. If appellants fail to fulfill their marshaling duties and simply "cite to
the evidence which supports his or her position" the Court has "sufficient ground for
affirming the trial court's findings." Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, ^j 9, 144 P.3d
1147 (citations omitted).
In its eighty three (83) page Memorandum Decision25 as well as the Ruling and
Order, which incorporated the Memorandum Decision in its entirety, the Court expressly
states that Road width was not a focus of the litigation, that it was not required to make a
determination of the width of the Road, that Summit County was an appropriate body, by
both statute and policy, to make the factual determination of the necessary and reasonable
width of the Road, and that no "taking" or potential "taking" occurred or could occur by
any alleged "road widening." [See H.R. 001469, ^ 54; 001469, If 55; 001470, U 55; 1471,
1J56; 001474, \ 60; 001689, p. 10, copies of the Memorandum Decision and Ruling and
Order are attached hereto as Appendices "A" and "B", respectively.] Despite these
5

Such a lengthy decision was warranted given the 174 Exhibits admitted at trial, the 26
live witnesses, and four deposition testimonies submitted to the trial court. Further, given
the highly factual nature of road dedication cases and the long time frame of relevant
events, the trial court correctly provided detailed facts showing careful consideration of
all of the various factual elements establishing the existence of the public road.
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findhigs, llaynes does not pro Her an\ _e\ ideiuje in supporioi jhc trial court's
determinations listed above. Rather, 1 layncs mcreh rehashes arguments it made to the
trial court,. [See, e.g., H.R 0012 1 ; 001280:1 LR 00150 1 152111 LR 001522-1529; I I.R.
•••' ,!

!• •'*
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the evidence supporting the trial court's position, the tria; conn's ruiing to allow Summit
County to determine the reasonable and necessary width I>1 the pwi"'iu. ruau ^homvi ne
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Even il'I laynes' had marshaled the evidence as it is required to do. its claims fail.
B. THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO MAKE ,*•
DETERMINATION OF RO \ D WIDTH A S IT W \ S NOT * !-><";
TI IE I J T I G \TTON
Contrary to its position it I its Motion for Summan Imposition, I laynes has now
admilled thru ifthe widlh of a roadwax is in *t the focus olThe litigation then a tiial court
does not have U> make a ueu-rmmaiii;n regarding u.»: w ;;.;j. : i ;;;<. AIM;,
'-• .' tn<(< •' ".

\ i ia\ i., - \v., -;,

-' '?'<>( '«•- , ,; .7 ir.-;/v/.' I h'wLfinh *:• ( 'nr"ar. •//>••/ v. Pinecresl

Pipeline Operating, Co., 900 P.2d 225. 232 (Utah 1995) (holding that that "it was nu
error ior die district court to refuse to dctcnniuc ilu wuli.'i vi the ;oao wt^i: ilita issue was

emphasis on road width during this appeal, width was not a focus of the underlying
litigation.
Tl lis ease 1 las beei i pei iciii ig since Septen lbei 1998. \S- "c: " I LR 00139< I j: •. 2 ]
There were five days of trial in March of 2008, during which 26 witnesses testified and
174 Exhibits were received. [Trial Tr. Vol. I, pp. 3^4; Trial Tr. Vol. II, pp. 259-260; Trial
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Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 474-475; Trial Tr. Vol. IV , pp. 746-747.] The entire focus of the
dispute for the last ten years has been whether certain sections of the Road traversing
Haynes' and Jacob-Christensen's property were public.
As the trial court stated, "there was precious little by way of evidence presented
concerning the width of any portion of this road." [H.R. 001470, ^ 55.] Indeed, cc[t]he
Court was unaware the issue of width may arise specifically, and in fact it was hardly
mentioned during trial except in closing argument and in one post-trial brief" [H.R.
001470, Tj 55.]
Further, it does not appear that Haynes is seriously arguing that road width was a
focus of the Lawsuit such that the trial court had an obligation or even sufficient
information to make a determination regarding the reasonable and necessary width of the
Road. Indeed, Haynes cites to no evidence that width of the Road was a focus of the
Lawsuit. [See generally, Appellant Brief pp. 16-26.] Instead Haynes makes the
conclusory statement that "[e]vidence on all of this was before the trial court" without
any citation to the record. [Haynes' Brief, p. 26]; Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure24(a)(l) ("[a]ll statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall
be supported by citations to the record."); Butler, 909 P.2d at 230 ("failure to cite to the
record in a brief is grounds for assuming regularity in the proceedings and correctness in
the judgment appealed from." (citations omitted)).
Accordingly, at the very least, it should be determined that width was not a focus
of the litigation such that the trial court was in a position to make the highly fact
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dependent determination regarding the reasonable aiid necessary width of the Road.
Butler, 9(W l\2d al 232.
C 1 1 4 VINES' IN I Iilli I RE I < i ' il IK )I I Of I I I AI I C( ) D E A N N . ^

, 1 - I t., -, •

72-5 108 IS I J.NS1 I'l" IF - Z I !: I • \ I l l E ^ NT) J 1 S \RGl I MENTti i- \ I i •
1laynes claims that if the trial court does not decide the width of a road dedicated
U) (lie public by use. then no other party inay make that decision. [Haynes' Brief, p. 17],

owever. Haynes asserts this position without citation to any authority or evidence,

arguing that the coi n 11 t n ist sii i rply "leave tl ic road at its : xisting widtl f \\ ill 101 it ai ly
regard lo the safely or convenience of the pubiu
Man /;</;// v I'urk

j I laynes' Brief pp. ! 7-1 8 j: sec

( i l v . / / i c . . \ \ U; •. o S ] (]- 'lah Ct. App. I vW"7) ("We *• ill uoi •. en>ider

issues.") (citations omitted).
Ilaynes makes this wholly unsupported and eritiealh flawed argument despite the

of public roads, jusi like the Road at issue in this ea^e, max be determined b\ oilier P\ : :
bodied iffue issue is not the focus of die liiication before ihe irial eoun.
1. S n in in i t C o ii n t y h a s t h e \ i 11 111 o r i ty to I) e %

i e R e a s o n a b I e a n tl

N e c e s s a r;; • W ' i d t h o f a R o a i 1 D e d i c a t e d t'v
Haynes asserts that the trial court cannot delegate the Road width decision to
Summit County because I Jtah Code Ann. § 72-5-108 only provides Summit Coin lty
ai ithoi ity IU ) detei I i lii ic tl ic widtl i of i oads it develops ai id i lot tc • detei n lii ic the widtl i ; )f
roads dedicated to the public pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 7 2 o - i u 4 . j ] !a\ n e ^ Briei, p.
22.] Not even aUcmplinu to find support for ihis assertion in the statutes themselves,
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Haynes instead points to inapposite case law in which courts have determined that a road
has been dedicated to the public. [Id., p. 17, n. 80.] Simply because courts have decided
that a road is public pursuant Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104, however, does not mean that
courts are the sole agents that can determine road width. Such a conclusion would
require this Court to completely ignore the broad authorizing language of Utah Code
Ann. §72-5-108. Indeed, Haynes' assumption that Utah Code Ann. §§ 72-5-104 and 725-108 are mutually exclusive is misguided. A simple reading of the two statutes shows
that they work together seamlessly. Selman, Inc. v. Box Elder County, 2009 UT App. 99,
Tf 6, 208 P.3d 535 (The best evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of the
statute which are given their plain, natural and ordinary meaning), (citations omitted).
Paragraph 2 of Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 states that a dedication and
abandonment creates a "right of way held by the state." Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(2).
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-108, in turn, allows "authorities of the state, counties, or
municipalities" to determine the width of those rights of way under their jurisdiction.
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 then directs those authorities to designate a width that "is
reasonable and necessary to ensure safe travel according to the facts and circumstances."
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104Q).6
For example, if a state, county, or municipal authority determines that a road has
been dedicated to the public pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 and there is no

6

Haynes asserts that the current version of Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 does not apply
because it was amended in 2001, after the Lawsuit was filed - this is incorrect. There
was no claim under Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 until Jacob Christensen filed its
Counterclaim on March 15, 2003. [H.R. 000065-000079].
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judicial challenge to such determination, Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(3) provides
guidance to state, county, or municipal authorities regarding the reasonable and necessary
width of those roads, and Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-108 gives them the authority to
determine that width. This harmonious reading of two Utah statutes is entirely
foreclosed by Haynes' strained interpretation.
Alternatively, when there is a dispute over whether a road has been dedicated to
the public pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 and it is determined by the trial court
that it has, in fact, been dedicated to the public, it is possible that the width of the road is
not the focus of the litigation. See, e g., Butler, 909 P.2d 225. When this occurs, Utah
Code Ann. § 72-5-108 provides the right to the local authority with jurisdiction over the
road to make a determination of width pursuant to the standards set by Utah Code Ann. §
72-5-104(3). Again, this is precisely what has occurred, and as opposed to Haynes'
polarizing interpretation, harmonizes the two closely related statutory provisions.7 Duke
v Graham, 2007 UT 31, ^| 16 (stating that a court is to construe statutory provisions in
harmony with other statutes under the same and related chapters.) (citations omitted).

7

Haynes also rehearses the legislative history of § 72-5-108, asserting that if the Utah
legislature did not want Utah courts determining the width of roads dedicated pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104, it would have amended the provisions of Section 108 to
expressly prohibit the courts from doing so. [See Haynes' Memo, at 3-6]. As held in
Butler, however, courts may determine the width of roads declared public rights of way
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104, but they are not required to do so if the width of
the subject road is not the focus of the litigation before the court, such as here.
Accordingly, there is no need for the Utah legislature to alter Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-108
because it is entirely consistent with the existing case law.
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2. The Trial Court Utilized Sound Judicial Policy in Deferring the
Decision Regarding Road Width to Summit County.
Rather than leave the issue regarding road width for further litigation or do
nothing and jeopardize the safety of the traveling public, the trial court utilized sound
judicial policy in deferring the decision to Summit County pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
72-5-108. The trial court cited Chief Justice Durham's recent dissenting opinion in
Pearson v Pearson, 2008 UT 24, 182 P.3d 353, in which she stated that
in the judicial analytic hierarchy, questions should be resolved with
statutory answers prior to recourse to either common law solutions or
constitutional review.
Id. at *f| 38; [H.R. 001471, f 55.] Accordingly, when faced with a determination of
whether to force additional litigation or to defer to the authority granted by the Utah
Legislature to Summit County pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-108, the trial court
appropriately chose the statutory solution.
Further, the relevance and application of Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-108 is
inescapable in this instance as Summit County has reflected the Road on its maps as a
Class D county road for the past 30 years, thereby making it a public road under the
jurisdiction of Summit County. [Trial Ex. 114.] Accordingly, it is only reasonable that
Summit County, as expressly authorized by the Utah Legislature, be the body that makes
the determination regarding the width of the Road.
It would be patently irresponsible for the trial court to do as Haynes requests and
simply leave the width of the road dedicated to the public as its beaten path. Indeed,
clear statutory provisions as well as established case law show that this is not a viable
26
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option. Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 states that the "scope of the right of way is that
which is reasonable and necessary to ensure safe travel according to the facts and
circumstances." (emphasis added). Further, as the trial court correctly noted, the Utah
Supreme Court has held specifically that "the width of the road is not to be measured by
the width of the beaten track." [H.R.001468 (citing Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 116 P.2d 420
(Utah 1941).] Rather, "dedication of a roadway to automobile traffic is the dedication of
a roadway of sufficient width for safe and convenient use thereof by such traffic."
Jeremy, 101 Utah 1, 10, 116 P.2d 420 (emphasis added); see also, Jennings Investment,
LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009 UT App. 119, \ 34, 208 P.3d 1077 (stating that mere
"[e]vidence of the width of the Road does not address the reasonable and necessary
requirement for determining width of the Road."); [H.R. 001469.] By allowing Summit
County to determine the reasonable and necessary width of the Road to ensure safe
travel, the trial court followed sound public policy as expressly defined by the Legislature
and long standing case law.
3. Haynes Is Not Entitled to Remand with Instructions to Determine
Width Based Upon the Historical Use from 1880 to 1896.
Haynes' assertion that it is entitled to a remand for a determination of the width of
the Road during the period between 1880 and 1896 fails for similar reasons. Haynes
asserts that if it is not entitled to remand with directions limiting the width of the Road to
18 feet, it is entitled to remand with instructions that the determination of the width of the
Road be limited to the width and nature of the uses from 1880 to 1896. [Haynes5 Brief,
pp. 29-31.] Haynes' position is directly contrary to established policy and law.
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As a preliminary matter, the trial court did not hold that the road was public only
between 1880 through 1896 as Haynes apparently claims. Rather, the trial court held that
there was nothing barring the public from traveling freely on the Road from 1865 until
1932:
[BJased on the evidence, the court concludes that people.. .certainly used
portions of this road...for at least 10 years, from perhaps 1865 to 1932, and
certainly up to the time of statehood in 1896. The court finds that evidence
overwhelming in fact.
[H.R.001448,1| 22.] The trial court held that "from at least 1880-1896" the road had been
used continuously by the public for ten years, but also stated that it was not until 1941
that public use was interrupted. [H.R. 001436, f73; 001459, % 42 (emphasis added).]
Haynes fails entirely to mention this finding by the trial court and instead misconstrues
the trial court's conclusions as well as the evidence presented at trial.
Further, a road dedicated to the public through use is not frozen in time to the
width of the road at the time it became public. In Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1, 9,
116 P.2d 420 (1941), the Court stated that "[w]e cannot agree with counsel that, where
the public have acquired the right to a public highway by user, they are limited to such
width as has actually been used by them." Rather, the Court determined that the width
of the public way must be wide enough to "make such use convenient and safe." Id. at
424. Similarly, while "the greater part of the travel on a county highway is doubtless
confined to the track made by vehicles, [] there must be room enough for travelers with
wagons, carriages, or implements to pass each other and for necessary improvements and

28
299473v2

repairs to be made so as to keep it in a suitable condition." Id. at 423 (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
The same concept is reflected in section 72-5-302 of the Utah Code. In that
o

section, the Utah Legislature declared: 'The scope of the R.S. 2477 right-of-way
includes the right to widen the highway as necessary to accommodate the increased travel
associated with those uses, up to, where applicable, improving a highway to two lanes so
travelers can safely pass each other." Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-302(4)(c) (2007).
Haynes' argument completely ignores the overriding principle in both judicial and
municipal width determinations: the safety and convenience of the traveling public.
Accordingly, the trial court was correct in allowing Summit County to determine the
reasonable and necessary width of the Road for the convenience and safety of the public.
4. There Can Be No Taking As Haynes Took the Property Subject to the
Public Road.
Rather than focusing on the safety and convenience of the traveling public in
determining the width of the Road, Haynes focuses instead on alleged private property
rights in its attempts to limit the width of the Road to the narrowest point possible.
Haynes' utakings" argument fails, however, as it purchased its property subject to the
public road and never had any private property "taken" from it.
The trial court stated in its Order and Ruling that "[t]his road was public before
Haynes bought the property and Haynes accepted and took the property subject to that
public right." [H.R.001687, p. 10.] 'Thus," the trial court stated, "it is not as if Haynes
8

R.S. 2477 roads are dedicated rights of way over federal land. Utah Code Ann. 72-5302(2).
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owned land, the public then crossed it and used it, and thus Haynes is being deprived of
something he had but now has lost[]", rather, "Haynes never 'had' this road, it has been
public since long before he purchased the land surrounding the public road." [H.R.
001460, *! 43.] This finding of the trial court is consistent with Utah law. See, e.g.,
Sullivan v. Condas, 76 Utah 585, 290 P. 954, 957 (Utah 1930) (cc...[A]nd the plaintiffs
when they acquired their interest in and to the lands, took them subject to the easement in
favor of the public, unless it was thereafter extinguished by operation of the state law,
which was not done.5'). Further, given that a public way is not simply limited to the
beaten path, but is a width that is necessary and convenient for the safe travel of the
public, Haynes took the property subject to the reasonable and necessary width of the
public way. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(3). Accordingly, Haynes never had
anything to "take" and its assertions fail.
5. Summit County Has the Expertise Necessary to Make a Reasoned
Determination Regarding the Width of the Road Pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §§ 72-5-104 & 108.
Haynes is not harmed by the trial court's decision to allow Summit County to
establish the width of the Road. Haynes argues that Summit County is "an institutionally
poor forum for finding facts" and that the trial court is in a better position to determine
the appropriate width. [Appellant Brief, p. 23.] This claim is false given that little
evidence regarding the width of any portion of the Road was submitted and that the trial
court itself noted that it "was unaware the issue of width may arise specifically, and in
fact it was hardly mentioned during trial except in closing argument and in one post-trial
brief." [H.R. 001470, t 55.]
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Far to the contrary of Haynes' assertions, Summit County is in the best position to
determine the reasonable and necessary width of the Road based upon established
codification, experience, and expertise in determining the appropriate width for the roads
under its jurisdiction.
In post trial briefing, Summit County submitted the Affidavit of Derrick Radke,
the Summit County Engineer, setting forth the standards which Summit County has
codified regarding the determination of road width and making a recommendation
regarding the proposed width of the Road. [H.R. 001491 (referring to the attached
Affidavit of Derrick Radke).] Mr. Radke testified that he was familiar with the road at
issue and,
taking into account terrain, grade, anticipated speed of travel, approved
development densities under zoning laws, drainage, maintenance, prior use,
and other similar factors, [his] recommendation to the Board of County
Commissioners will be that this public right of way must be at least 36 feet
wide to ensure proper travel width, safety, and maintenance under
AASHTO and Development Code standards. Of this total, 18 feet should
constitute the traveled surface area. This width will allow two emergency
vehicles to safely pass one another. The remaining 18 feet allows for 9 feet
on either side of the road for further safety and to facilitate proper
maintenance and use in keeping with the Development Code and Section
11-6-9 of the Summit County Code.
[Id] Given the detail and consideration given by Mr. Radke to the appropriate width of
the public right of way, it can hardly be said that the recommendation is overly broad,
biased, or poorly conceived. The recommended width provides enough room for two
emergency vehicles to pass and adequate shoulder for the purposes of safety as well as to
ensure that those pulled over on the side of the road are not trespassing.
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Further, as noted in case law cited by Haynes, the codes and standards adopted by
states and counties are evidence of reasonable width and in fact, should be referenced in
determining the appropriate width of roads under Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104. See
Hunsaker v. State, 509 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 1973) (The Court looked first to statutory
presumptions regarding the width of a public road and then to potentially rebutting
evidence); see also, Schaer v. Utah Dept. of Transportation, 657 P.2d 1337, 1342 (Utah
1983) (city ordinances on road width may be "offered as evidence of what is considered
reasonable and necessary under the circumstances"). Given that these are the very
standards Haynes asserts the trial court should apply in determining the width of the
Road, it is very difficult to see how Haynes can show prejudice when those same
standards were properly applied by Summit County.9
6. The Court Did Not Find that 18 Feet was the Appropriate Width of the
Road.
Haynes asserts on multiple occasions in its Appellate Brief that the trial court
found that 18 feet was the appropriate width of the Road. [See, e.g., Haynes' Brief, pp.
26, 27.] This is wrong as well as highly misleading. In the final Ruling and Order issued
by the trial court, which Haynes ignores completely in its Appellate Brief, the trial court
stated that "[t]he court's comments as to its 'feelings' [regarding road width in the
Memorandum Decision] were in essence dicta and thoughts as the court ruled and

Also of note is the fact that Jacob-Christensen is equally impacted by Summit
County's determinalion regarding width of the Road as a substantial portion of the Road
traverses its property.
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reaffirms that the decision as to the width of a public road belongs to Summit
County." [H.R. 001687, p. 10,1f 1 (emphasis added).]
Thus, the trial court's dicta "feelings" regarding what might be an appropriate
width were firmly rejected in the final Ruling and Order. This is appropriate given that
"there was precious little by way of evidence presented concerning the width of any
portion of this road." [R001470, «(| 55.] Accordingly, Haynes' request that this Court
remand with instruction to the trial court to declare the appropriate width of the Road as
18 feet is in error.
7. If the Trial Court Is Directed to Determine the Width of the Road, the
Issue Should be Remanded for Additional Evidence.
If this Court determines that the trial court was obligated to make a determination
of the width of the Road, the Court should remand with instructions to the trial court to
hold additional briefing and evidentiary hearings. This instruction is necessary given that
"there was precious little by way of evidence presented concerning the width of any
portion of this road" and that width was "hardly mentioned during trial." [H.R. 001470, ^|
55; H.R. 001470, lj 55.] In order for the trial court to properly determine the reasonable
and necessary width of the road for the safety of the traveling public additional evidence
must be presented for the trial court to make additional findings of fact.
10

On a related note, Haynes' representation that the Road is currently 8-10 feet wide
mischaracterizes the evidence presented to the trial court. [See, e.g., Haynes' Brief, pp.
11, 32]. Though the width of the Road was not the focus of the litigation, on a handful of
occasions width was mentioned incidental to the use and condition of the Road at various
times. For example, testimony did come in that the Road at its narrowest was eight feet
in 1945. [Trial Tr. Vol. IV, p. 797:1-22]. Other testimony regarding the width of the
Road incidental to its use and condition, however, was that it was between 18 and 25 feet
in width. [Trial Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 816:25-818:2].
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D. HAYNES CANNOT MAKE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES FOR
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
Haynes5 unfounded assertions that Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-108 is unconstitutional
and that the trial court unconstitutionally delegated "core judicial functions" were not
raised below and have been waived. [See Haynes' Brief, pp. 22-27.] Haynes argues for
the first time on appeal that "section 72-5-108 cannot constitutionally permit a trial court
to delegate the determination of road width to a county legislative body" and cites to Salt
Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994), a case which sets out the standards for
determining whether a statute unconstitutionally usurps core judicial functions.
[Haynes' Brief, p. 23.]
While arguments relating to the trial court's duty under the existing case law were
made by Haynes at the trial court, claims of any constitutional obligation of the trial court
or of the unconstitutionality of Utah Code Ann. §72-5-108 were not. Accordingly,
Haynes' assertions regarding "delegation of a core judicial function" are not
appropriately presented to the Court. State v Dean, 2004 UT 63, ^f 13 (u[I]n general,
appellate courts will not consider an issue, including constitutional arguments, raised for
the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or the case involves
exceptional circumslances").] ] Haynes has not cited to any part of the record preserving

11

Even if Haynes had preserved such constitutional challenges, Utah Code Ann. § 72-5108 is not inconsistent with a court's role in making determinations regarding the
existence of a public right of way and does not unconstitutionally delegate "a core
judicial function." Jones v. Utah Board of Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53, ^j 10 (citing
Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1994) (stating that "[statutes are
presumed to be constitutional until the contrary is clearly shown. It is only when statutes
manifestly infringe upon some constitutional provision that they can be declared void.
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such constitutional challenge nor has it made any arguments establishing how it should
nevertheless be allowed to make such constitutional challenges as a result of plain error
or exceptional circumstances, neither of which exists here.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING HAYNES'
SWEEPING AND NEVER BEFORE PRESENTED REQUEST FOR A
DECLARATION QUIETING TITLE TO ALL OF HAYNES' PROPERTY
In its Appellate Brief, Haynes requests - for the first time, at the last minute of the

last hour of this Lawsuit - that it is entitled to a declaration that other than the Road, there
are absolutely no other encumbrances on its property, past, present, or future, despite the
fact that the sole claim against the Haynes' property at issue at trial was the existence of
the one singular Road.

This expansive and unwarranted request effectively constitutes

an attempt to take by ambush what was not at issue before the trial court. Accordingly,
the trial court's refusal to include such expansive, surprise relief was more than
appropriate and should be affirmed. Merrill v. Bailey and Son, 99 Utah 323, 331, 106
P.2d 255 (Utah 1940) (citations omitted) (stating that in equity cases appellate courts
review the record to determine whether the evidence clearly preponderates against the
findings of the trial court. The findings should not be disturbed unless the clear weight of
the evidence is against them.).
Every reasonable presumption must be indulged in and every reasonable doubt resolved
in favor of constitutionality."). Indeed Haynes' fails entirely to conduct any of the
analysis required under Ohm to establish that a core judicial function is being usurped.
Simply asserting that other courts have made determinations regarding width of public
roads does not make such decisions a core judicial function.
While Haynes' specifically references an area of land commonly known as Red Hole,
which traverses both Haynes and Jacob Christensen property, the relief requested would
cover any potential past present or future claim of right against the Haynes property.
[Haynes' Brief, p. 27].
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An action to quiet title is one for equitable relief to quiet an existing valid title
against a certain affirmative claim against it. Utah State Department of Social Services v
Santiago, 590 P.2d 335, 337 (Utah 1979). In order to obtain such equitable relief, one
"must allege title, entitlement to possession, and that the estate or interest claimed by
others is adverse or hostile to the alleged claims of title or interest." Id. at 337-338; see
also, Malualani B. Hoopiiana Trust v. Hoopiiana, 206 UT 53 ^f 26 (same). The scope of
a quiet title action, therefore, is based upon the affirmative claims made against the owner
of the title. See id.; see, e.g., 65 Am. Jur. 2d § 28 (cc[M]ere apprehension by an owner
that an adverse claim will be asserted is insufficient to confer equity jurisdiction, [and] a
claimant must usually wait until his or her rights have been actually interfered with
before he or she can, by a quiet title suit, implied another from who he or she anticipates
an injury.")
In this dispute, the sole adverse claim at issue was the existence of a public road or
prescriptive right held by Jacob Christensen and/or others over a discrete section of land
commonly referred to (in the singular) as the Road. This is consistent with Haynes'
pleadings as well as the evidence developed over the course of the ten years this case was
pending before the trial court.
Indeed, all of the evidence Haynes presents in support of its contention that it is
entitled to sweeping additional relief actually contradicts its position. As an initial
matter, as noted by Haynes, the Court expressly stated in its Memorandum Decision that
"[tjhere is another road, which the court will call the West Fork Road, about which there
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seems little dispute." [H.R. 1408. ^f 7.] Accordingly, the Court expressly acknowledged
that any road other than the one singular Road was not at issue.
The focus and intent of the Lawsuit over the course of its ten year history is further
clarified when one looks at Haynes' own pleadings.

In its Verified Complaint, Haynes

asserts that
Historically and up to the present day, access to the Jacob Christensen
property has been gained by means of a grant of a limited right of way or
easement strictly for agricultural purposes, which right of way or easement
is evidence by that certain Quit Claim Deed, a copy of which is attached
hereto marked Exhibit U C"....
[H.R. 00003, If 12.] The Exhibit C, referenced in the Verified Complaint, is a 1939
Quitclaim Deed for a right of way over that proceeds directly over the Bench Road
portion of the Road at issue in this dispute. Specifically, the right of way is
50 feet wide on both sides from the center line of an old road up the East
Fork of Chalk Creek, said road entering the SE1/2 of said Section 36, Tp. 3
N. R. 7 E., S.L.B. & M , at a point on the North (east and west line) of said
quarter section on a bench west of chalk creek, and following said road
thence to its Southeasterly terminal at the SW corner of Section 17, Tp. 2
N.R. 9E., S.L.B. &M.
[H.R. 000003, p. 3, U 12 (emphasis added).]

The "old road" referenced in the 1939

Quitclaim Deed roadway traverses the route commonly referred to as the Bench Road
portion of the Road.
In paragraph 14 of the Verified Complaint, Haynes references and attaches an
agreement between Jacob Christensen and Haynes entered into in June of 1984 (the
"1984 Agreement"), which expressly designates the roadway which has been the
historical and present focus of the dispute between the parties at issue in the Lawsuit.
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Specifically, the 1984 Agreement states that "controversies have arisen between the
parties as to their respective rights and responsibilities in the roadway... which traverses
the Haynes property and provides ingress and egress to the Jacobs/Christensen property."
[H.R. 000004, p. 4, ^} 14 (referring to Exhibit D) (emphasis added).] The roadway is
specifically defined as the "old road" referenced in the 1939 Quitclaim Deed referenced
above - the Bench Road portion of the Road. [Id.]
In paragraph 23 of Haynes' Verified Complaint there is a reference to a letter from
Haynes to Summit County on June 26, 1997, which objected to Jacob Christensen's use
of the Road. In that letter, the section of the road at issue is the same Bench Road
described in the "deeded right-of-way" set forth in the 1939 Quit Claim Deed referenced
above. [H.R. 000006, p. 6, ^ 23 (referencing Exhibit F) (emphasis added).]
Finally, Haynes explicitly refers to and specifically defines that this Lawsuit
concerns only one singular roadway in its Pre-Trial Brief:
This action was commenced by Haynes the [sic] filing of its Complaint
seeking an adjudication that Jacob Christensen, as owners of the JC Ranch,
are not entitled to the use of any portion of the Roadway across the Haynes
Ranch, except as expressly provided for in Plaintiffs' Exhibits 6, 7, 8, and
9.
[H.R. 001252-001253 (emphasis added).]13 Haynes then goes on to specifically define
the Roadway into the sections commonly referred to throughout the trial as "the 'Bench
Road', the 'East Fork Road', and the 'Middle Fork Road'" and describes the precise route

13

The Exhibits referenced once again refer to historic rights of way describing the Bench
Road portion of the Road.
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each section travels. [H.R. 001253-001254.] No mention is made of Red Hole or any
other road that may exist which may be in dispute.
Further, Trial Exhibit 117 was referred to extensively throughout the litigation to
point out the location of the Road, points of interest along and around it, the boundary of
the Road, etc. It was received without objection and was treated by all parties as
accurately reflecting the Road at issue. [Trial Tr. Vol. I at p. 26:3-20.] Indeed, it is the
very map that Haynes attached as Appendix D to their Appellate Brief without any
objection, caveat, or condition.
In fact, there is no evidence that any areas other than the Road were ever at issue
at trial. There are references made to Red Hole during the trial, but those were all in
connection with orienting the trial court to the location of the Road, the properties of the
parties, and the use of the Bench Road to access that area, not to establish a public road or
easement over any road or trail that might go down into the Red Hole area. [See, e.g.,
Trial Tr. Vol. I, pp. 26:21-27:11, 32:10-16, 62:18-24, 70:20-71:6, 89:4-19; Trial Tr. Vol.
2, pp. 425:23-426:13, 428:10-22, 429:7-430:19; Trial Tr. Vo. Ill, pp. 648:10-22; Trial Tr.
Vol. V, pp. 922:15-924:11,931:8-932:19.]
Further, even if there were incidental references to rights over any other roads, or
access points, it would be wholly unjust to adjudicate rights regarding any other areas
given that ten years of litigation was focused on the one singular Road. See, e.g., Lee v.
Sanders, 2002 UT App 281, Tf 7, 55 P.3d 1127 ("A trial court may not base its decision
on an issue that was tried inadvertently.").

Accordingly, the trial court was correct in

rejecting Haynes5 sweeping and untimely request for relief.
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In addition, Haynes entirely fails to marshal the evidence in support of the trial
court's finding that Haynes is not entitled to a quiet title determination on anything other
than the disputed Road. Instead, Haynes simply refers to two paragraphs in its Verified
Complaint and one partial quote from the Court's Memorandum decision - skewing the
references entirely in favor of its argument - and states that it is entitled to relief not
granted by the Trial Court. [Appellant Brief at pp. 27-29.] Haynes' marshaling efforts
fail to meet its obligations under the rules and laws of this court and the trial court's
findings should be affirmed. Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, ^ 9, 144 P.3d 1147 (If
appellants fail to fulfill their marshaling duties and simply "cite to the evidence which
supports his or her position" the Court has "sufficient ground for affirming the trial
court's findings.")
III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT PORTIONS OF THE
ROAD ARE PUBLIC IS CORRECT AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
Haynes' claims of insufficient public use are firmly contradicted by the

"overwhelming" evidence presented at trial. The use of the Road by the public was
continuous and unchallenged from as early as 1865 until at least 1932. Indeed, Haynes'
woefully deficient effort to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's decision is
enough to uphold the trial court's determination that the Bench Road, Middle Fork, and
East Fork to Section 8 have been dedicated to the public. Further, it is clear by the
evidence on record and established case law that the use of the road was by the public,
was not permissive, was substantial, and continued for a period of over 65 years.
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A. THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATIONS ARE ACCORDED A GREAT
DEAL OF DEFERENCE IN ROAD DEDICATION CASES.
Historically, appellate courts have granted trial courts "a fair degree of latitude in
determining the legal consequences under [the road dedication statute.]5' Heber City
Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 309-310 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). Specifically,
We review the trial court's legal interpretation of the Dedication Statute for
correctness and its factual finding for clear error. But whether the facts of a
case satisfy the requirements of the Dedication Statute is a mixed question
of fact and law that involves various and complex facts, evidentiary
resolutions, and credibility determinations. Thus we review the trial court's
decision regarding whether a public highway has been established under
[the Dedication Statute]... for correctness but grant the court significant
discretion in its application of the facts to the statute.
Jennings Investment, LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 119, ^f 5, 208 P.3d
1077 (citing Town of Leeds v. Prisbrey, 2008 UT 11, lj 5, 179 P.3d 757) (emphasis
added). Further, in making such a determination, the appellate court "considers] the
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings...." Id. (citations omitted).
B. HAYNES FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE
TRIAL COURT'S DECISION.
Haynes' effort to marshal the evidence related to the trial court's finding that the
Bench portion of the Road was dedicated to the public pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 785-104 is a hopelessly short list of time periods, with no explanation of even those bare
facts or how they support the trial court's conclusions. [Appellant Brief, pp. 33-37.]
Given the extensive evidence actually presented at trial, it is clear that Haynes' has failed
to meet its marshalling obligations and the trial court's determinations regarding the
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dedication of the Road to public use should be deemed accurate. [See, e.g., H.R. 0013931477; Statement of Facts, supra; Subsection III. C, infra.]
Haynes may not simply "re-argue the factual case presented in the trial court" and
also cannot merely present carefully selected facts and excerpts from the record in
support of its position. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, «fl 78, 100 P.3d 1177. If the
evidence is inadequately marshaled, the court assumes that all findings are adequately
supported by the evidence. See id., Iflfl9, ^80. As has been established by the Statement
of Facts - Haynes efforts fail to meet even their basic marshalling obligations and the
trial court's determination that the designated portions of the Road are public should be
affirmed.
C. THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S
DETERMINATION IS "OVERWHELMING."
As is customary in road dedication cases, the factual record in this case is
extensive - this is particularly so given that the case was pending for over ten years before
the trial court. [H.R. 001394.] Haynes' alleged marshaling efforts - limited "primarily" to
"documentary evidence" - fail to do any sort of justice to the factual record presented to
the trial court over the many days at trial.
No doubt there were many documents presented, ancient as well as contemporary,
that comprise the 174 Exhibits in the Record. [Trial Tr. Vol. I, pp. 3-4; Trial Tr. Vol. II,
pp. 259-260; Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 474-475; Trial Tr. Vol. IV , pp. 746-747.]

In addition

to the documentary evidence, however, and contrary to Haynes' woefully inadequate
description of the evidence and testimony, there were numerous live witnesses (twenty
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six14) as well a witness testimony in the form of depositions (four witnesses not present at
trial15) presented at trial regarding use of the Road from the 1920s through the present. In
fact, the trial court noted that the testimony of the live witnesses "was all relevant as it
tended to prove an issue in the case, namely, who had used this road and under what
conditions." [H.R. 001422, p. 30, f!9.]
In addition to the live testimony, deposition testimony, and documentary evidence,
the trial court judge, Judge Lubeck, had an opportunity to view the Road first hand in a
day long physical tour of the Road during which the trial court's clerk took notes as the
parties described the history of various areas along the Road and past uses. [H.R. 001037,
H.R. 001437, p. 45, ^ 74.] This physical inspection is particularly noteworthy because it
qualifies the trial court to make specific findings regarding the Road.

14

William L. Christensen, Trial Tr. Vol. I, pp. 117-175; Charles Horman, Trial Tr. Vol. I,
pp. 177-229; Stephen Jacob, Trial Tr. Vol. II, pp. 261-310; William E. Christensen, Trial
Tr. Vol. II, pp. 311-339; Gary Boyer, Trial Tr. Vol. II, pp. 346-393, Trial Tr. Vol. IV, pp.
855-869; Greg Boyer, Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 402-410; Fern Boyer, Trial Tr. Vol. II, pp.
414-450; Eugene Hansen, Trial Tr. Vol. II, pp. 451-458; Robert Powell, Trial Tr. Vol. Ill,
pp. 478-500; C. Kay Crittenden, Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 501-526; Alfred Blonquist, Trial
Tr. Vol. II, pp. 461-467; Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 529-535, Trial Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 871-873;
Alan Spriggs, Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 540-552; Calvin Haskell, Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 573598; L. Kent Garfield, Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, 603-606; Howard Haynes, Jr., Trial Tr. Vol. Ill,
pp. 607-683; Derrick Radke, Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 685-698; Shirley MacFarlane, Trial
Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 701-739; Thomas W. Moore, Trial Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 749-756; Dan
Blonquist, Trial Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 757-766; Dave Edmunds, Trial Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 767-772;
James M. Blonquist; Trial Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 773-778; Clifton Blongquist, Trial Tr. Vol. IV,
pp. 780-793; Waynes Jones, Trial Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 793-800; Grant MacFarlane, Trial Tr.
Vol. IV, pp. 806-832; Dennis Wright, Trial Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 835-849; Kent Wilde, Trial
Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 852-854.
15
Gwennola Blonquist Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 556; Lamont Staley, Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 554;
Lloyd Collard, Roy Metos - Trial Tr. Vol. IV, p. 874.
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Accordingly, Haynes' statements that the evidence was primarily documentary is
inaccurate. Further, Haynes argument that documentary evidence cannot constitute clear
and convincing evidence that a road has been dedicated to the public is incorrect. In fact,
clear and convincing evidence may be premised on historical documents, particularly
where such documents are more reliable evidence than decades-old witness recollections.
See Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 309, 313 (Utah 1997) (relying on witness
testimony and evidence that disputed road was designated as a public road on county maps
in holding that road had been dedicated to public); Bonner v. Sudbury, 417 P.2d 646, 64749 (Utah 1966) (relying on official records of the city and witness testimony in affirming
that disputed road had been dedicated to public use); Renfro v. McCowan, Case No. 2:05CV-00498, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84493, *12, 17 (D. Utah, Nov. 9, 2006) (holding aerial
photographs and testimony established by clear and convincing evidence that disputed
road was dedicated to public); see also, Wicker v. Harvey, 937 So. 2d 983, 990 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2006) ("ancient documents of record were more reliable evidence of what actually
existed" in 1943 at the time property was conveyed than the recollections of witnesses).
The trial court's determinations and well considered recitation of the
overwhelming factual record supporting its findings are well established in the
Memorandum Decision and are ample on their own to overcome Haynes' arguments
regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. [See generally, H.R. 001393-1477.] Haynes5
efforts to belittle the factual record before the trial court are further refuted by the
Statement of Facts above showing the historical, unencumbered, long standing,
continuous use of the Road for a period of at least 65 years by the public for uses such as
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hunting, recreating, grazing, timbering, and farming. [Statement of Facts, supra.]

Given

this overwhelming evidence and careful consideration by the trial court of historical
records, live witnesses, deposition testimony, and first hand viewing of the disputed Road,
Haynes' arguments fail and the trial court's determination regarding the dedication of
portions of the Road to the public should be affirmed.
D. THE ROAD WAS USED BY THE PUBLIC, WAS NOT PERMISSIVE, AND
WAS FOR A PERIOD OF OVER SIXTY-FIVE YEARS.
Rather than fulfill its obligations to marshal the evidence to accurately portray the
use of the Road, Haynes half-heartedly asserts that the use was only sporadic, that the use
by homesteaders is not considered use by the public, and that the use was permissive.
None of these arguments has merit.
1. Homesteaders are not Adjacent Landowners.
Haynes asserts that though homesteaders are not owners of the land, they
nonetheless have some amorphous right to the land such that they are effectively adjacent
land owners. [Haynes' Brief, pp. 39-40.] This is not supported by any law.
The Utah Supreme Court has noted that there are only two classes of people that
are not members of the public for the purposes of the Dedication Statute: "[individuals
with a private right to use a road, such as adjoining property owners who 'may have
documentary or prescriptive rights to use the road,' are not members of the public, nor
are those who have been given permission to use a road [from the land owner.]" Utah
County v. Butler, 2008 UT 12,1f 19, 179 P.3d 775 (Utah 2008). The homesteaders that
used the land at issue here do not fit either category.
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Federally owned land is public until such time as the homesteader is entitled to file
for a patent, but not before. Cassity v. 11 Castagno, 347 P.2d 834, 835, 10 Utah 2d 16
(Utah 1959). In other words, a homesteader does not have title or possessory interest to
the subject property until "the homestead entry is properly filed with the appropriate
government office." Lee v. Masner, 45 P.3d 794, 796 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). This is
consistent with U.S. Supreme Court holdings. For example in Wither spoon v. Duncan,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 210, 210, 18 L. Ed. 339, 342 (1866), the Court held that "[i]n no just
sense can land be said to be public lands after they have been entered at the land office
and a certificate of entry obtained. If public lands before the entry, after it they are
private property...." Id. at 210 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the property being
homesteaded does not become private until the application of the homesteader is filed
and recognized by the government authority. At all times prior, the land is public and
inhabited and traveled upon by members of the public.
In this case, the 1894 survey map for Township 2 North, Range 8 East shows that
every point of interest named on the map was in an even-numbered section of land,
except for the sawmill in Section 7. [Trial Ex. 112.] As a result, when the individuals
accessed the sawmill in Section 20, they accessed public land. When sheep owners
trailed in 100,000 sheep to the dipping corrals in Section 20, they accessed public land.
Moreover, when L.W. Randall, William Staley, and their respective families built cabins,
fences, and corrals, and established an irrigated field in Section 18 for more than ten
years before filing an entry of homestead, they did so on public land. Lee v. Masner, 45
P.3d 794, 795-96 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). Because these activities were on public land,
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the trial court correctly found that "ANYONE who used those sections, for any purpose,
appears to the court to be a member of the public."16 [H.R. 001454, ^ 33.] Haynes5
arguments accordingly fail.
2. Use of the Road by the Public was Not Permissive.
There is absolutely no evidence that the use of the Road was permissive. First, the
vast majority of the land at issue was not in the hands of private owners, but was public
and each and every person that used the road was, by necessity, a member of the public,
as stated above. [H.R. 001454,1J33.] Use of the Road over odd-sections of land also
constituted use by members of the public. When the Railroad filed its map of definite
location in 1869, it legally became the landowner of every odd section in the East Fork
area. 12 Stat. 489, § 3; H.R. Exec. Doc, Report of the Commissioner of Railroads,
Appendix 1, at 516 (1st Sess. 1883-84). Between 1869 and 1902 when the Railroad
owned the land, there is no evidence that the Railroad had involvement with the relevant
land. [See Trial Ex. 127.]

Indeed, as the trial court noted,

there is no indication in the record that the railroad ever seriously sought to
use this land, nor that any railroad ever attempted to interfere with its use
by the public on these odd numbered sections. Thus, while technically
perhaps private land as belonging to the railroad, the odd numbered
sections were really public as well. It is certainly clear from the record
before the court that there is no evidence the railroad ever sought to
exercise its rights as a landowner, during the tenure of ownership,
concerning the odd numbered sections at issue in this case.

Further, the trial court also noted that "the court is not basing its conclusion solely on
these homesteaders. They are merely some members of the public who used these
portions of the roads as indicated." [H.R. 001457,t37].
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[H.R. 001455, ^f 34.] Haynes does not mention this finding by the trial court or provide
any evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, the public was free to traverse the Road
across the railroad land as often as it found it convenient or necessary and they did so
without permission from anyone or anything.
Haynes also vaguely argues that the land was "wild, uncultivated, and unenclosed"
and therefore the use is deemed permissive. This argument is not persuasive. Indeed,
the factual premise Haynes asserts (that the land is akin to an open prairie without
obstacle which could be freely traversed in any direction) is not supported by the record.
The trial court, through its own observations, stated as much:
[N]ow having viewed the area, the court finds and concludes that persons
traveling to the blue Lake [sic] would certainly, at least by very strong
inference, use a road rather than cut through heavy timber, up and over
cliffs and other steep terrain. Persons obtaining timber, for example,
whether from a mill or on their own from the woods somewhere, would use
a wagon to haul the timber and that wagon would go on this road, rather
than through the wild and over steep terrain or over fallen timber. While
hunters may have strayed off the beaten path to find game, they sensibly
would travel Ihe road to get to an area to hunt rather than take off
immediately through the wild terrain, even if on horseback. That at least is
the reasonable inference the court draws from viewing this area and
considering the normal and reasonable human conduct.
[H.R. 001453, p. 62, 30.] Accordingly, Haynes' claims that use of the Road was
permissive fail.
3. Use of the Road by the Public was Substantial and Continuous for
Over 65 Years.
Last, Haynes attempts to fight the sufficiency of evidence by picking out a few
select bits of evidence from the time period of 1880-1896 and makes the conclusory
argument that the evidence is not sufficient. [Haynes' Brief, pp. 47-48.] Haynes fails,
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again, to acknowledge that the trial court did not limit its findings to that time period,
rather, the trial court stated that from at least that time, the road had become dedicated to
the public. [H.R.001448, ^ 22.] Haynes' attempts to belittle the "overwhelming"
evidence are unavailing and the trial court's findings should be affirmed.
CROSS APPEAL
It is the position of Jacob Christensen that the trial court erred in not finding that
the Road was dedicated to the public from at least point K on Trial Exhibit 117 to the
Blue Lakes. As a result of the trial court's failure to find this portion of the Road public,
Jacob Christensen is unable to access the Blue Lakes as well as certain portions of its
property.
As just noted above, when the trial court visited the property and traveled the
Road, it found and concluded "that persons traveling to the blue Lake [sic] would
certainly, at least by very strong inference, use the road...." This conclusion is consistent
with the clear and convincing testimony and historical documents demonstrating that the
public, including families and scout troops, continuously used the Road to get to the Blue
Lakes. [Trial Ex. 139, pp 10-11; Trial Tr. Vol. II, p. 428:10-22; G. Blonquist Depo., pp.
10:24-11:8, admitted at Trial Tr. Vol. II, pp. 425:23-426:8; Trial Ex. 262; Trial Tr. Vol.
Ill, pp. 502:5-504:18 (Crittenden testimony); Trial Tr. Vol. II, pp. 422:17-424:18,
433:14-435:9 (Fern Boyer testimony); Trial Ex. 261; Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 485:22-486:20
(Robert Powell testimony); Deposition of Lamont Staley, p. 17:12-21, admitted at Trial
Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 554; Trial Ex. 160, p.6.]
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The only evidence to the contrary which can be marshaled to support the trial
court's decision not to extend the Road to the Blue Lakes is that the Road did not
continue all the way to the Blue Lakes on an early map. This, however, is insufficient to
overcome the overwhelming evidence of decades of public use of the Road to get to the
Blue Lakes and the Court's own observation that the Road would need to be used to get
to the Blue Lakes due to the local topography.
Accordingly, Jacob Christensen hereby joins in the arguments of Boyer supporting
such finding of public dedication.
CONCLUSION
Because none of the arguments advanced by the Haynes is sufficient to show that
any error occurred, much less an error than in any way affected the outcome of the case,
the trial court should be affirmed with respect to the judgment rendered in favor of Jacob
Christensen. However, because the trial court erred in not extending the public Road to
its logical - as well as legally and factually supported conclusion - the trial court's
determination that the public portions of the Road do not extend through the Boyer
property should be reversed.
DATED this 6th day of August, 2009.
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS
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Jonathan O. Hafen '
Bryan S. Johansen
Attorneys for Jacob Christensen
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APPENDIX A
Memorandum Decision, March 21,2008, H.R. 001393-001477

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 980600244

vs.

Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK

JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK,
LIMITED, et.al.

DATE: March 21, 2008

Defendant,
JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK,
LIMITED, et.al.
Counterclaim Plaintiffs,

vs.
HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK
COMPANY,
Counterclaim Defendants
TRIPLE H RANCH LC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FERN BOYER, et.al.
Defendants and Third Party
Plaintiffs
vs.
HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK
COMPANY,
Third Party Defendants.

The above matter came before the court for a bench trial on
March 4, 5, 6, 7, and 11, 2008.

Haynes, Triple H, and Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users
were present with and through Ray G. Martineau and Leslie Slaugh;
Jacob-Christensen and Garff (Jacob) were present through Clark
Waddoups, Tobi D. Potestio and Jonathan 0. Hafen; the Boyer
parties (Fern Boyer, Gerald Boyer, Gregory Boyer and Alfred
Blonquist, Trustee) were present with and through Brent Bohman;
Summit County was present through Jami R. Brackin; and the State
of Utah was present through Steven G. Schwendiman. Paul R.
Poulsen for David B. Williams gave notice on March 3, 2008, that
Williams would not appear at or participate in the trial.
Timothy W. Blackburn for Bingham and Sons also filed a notice of
non-appearance on March 4, 2008.
A default certificate was entered April 18, 2006, against
Stillman, the Halls, Helen Blonquist and Karel Snyder, who had
written she has no property in Utah.

BACKGROUND
Haynes filed a complaint September 8, 1998.

It sought

declaratory judgment quieting title in plaintiff to property and
sought an adjudication of the rights and duties between Haynes
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and Jacob.

The original complaint originally named as defendants

Catherine Christensen, LLC and Brian Garff and Summit County.

It

also sought to enjoin defendants from interfering with
plaintiff's property rights.
In briefest summary, it alleged Haynes and Jacob owned
adjoining properties in an area of Summit County known as Chalk
Creek, Jacob's property being west and south of plaintiff's
property.

Historically there has been a limited right of way

across plaintiff's land to Jacob's land solely for agricultural
and livestock purposes.

In May 1984 the parties entered an

agreement which resolved the nature of Jacob's rights concerning
the easement and plaintiff's right to cross Jacob's property to
maintain an irrigation ditch to convey water from Jacob's
property to Haynes' property.

As to Garff, Haynes asserted Garff

had no right to passage over the Haynes property to reach a cabin
or other improvements, nor did Jacob, as such passage was beyond
the quit claim deed and agreement of 1984. As to Summit County,
plaintiff asserts the county improperly designated a private
roadway on Haynes' property as a public road.
Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Haynes owns its property,
has an easement over Jacob's property to service the irrigation
ditch, that the roadway across Haynes' property is not public and
is solely for agricultural purposes and uses by Jacob, and the
court should enjoin Summit County from issuing building permits
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pending the outcome of the case.
On September 28, 1998, Summit County was dismissed by
Haynes.
For reasons not shown by the file no action was taken until
service of process much later and Jacob filed an answer and
counterclaim on May 15, 2003.

It denied the essential

allegations and alleges Garff owns a cabin on the Jacob property
and Garff and Jacob have the right to use a road crossing the
Haynes property.

The road crosses Haynes property from SR 133,

the Chalk Creek Road, and extends southward to Jacob's property
and has been designated since 1978 as a Class D County road. It
is the only feasible means of access to the Jacob property and
has been in use since at least the mid- to late 1800s.
Jacob first seeks a declaration that the road is a Class D
County Road and is a public road and Haynes may not deny or
restrict Jacob's use.

Jacob also seeks a declaration that the

road has been in existence since the 1800s, is commonly known as
an RS 2477 road, in reference to an 1866 federal statute,
repealed in 1976. The road was part of the public domain and the
right of use may not be extinguished without proper state
procedures for abandonment of a public road.
Jacob secondly seeks the alternate declaration the road is a
public right of way.
Third, Jacob seeks a declaration of easement by necessity.
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Jacob alleges that before 1938, the Haynes and Jacob properties
were owned jointly by the Wright Brothers, and that Jacob bought
the property in 1938 and an easement was not expressly reserved
to cross Haynes property.

There is therefore an implied grant of

easement by necessity for access to the Jacob property.
Fourth, Jacob seeks a declaration that an easement was
granted.

This was granted February 3, 1939, and recorded, and it

is subject to reasonable expansion when livestock grazing is not
frequent and Jacob is entitled to enjoy the land for grazing,
hunting, camping, and recreation, including construction of
cabins to facilitate recreational use.
Fifth Jacob alternatively seeks a declaration of
prescriptive easement, that Jacob uses the road to access its
property, that has occurred for more than 20 years, the use has
been open and visible and without permission of Haynes.
Sixth, Jacob alleges trespass, that Haynes has threatened to
restrict Jacob's use and has locked gates.

In 1997 Garff

obtained a building permit to build a cabin on the Jacob
property.

Haynes then sought to restrict further approvals.

Damages have followed because of plaintiff's conduct.
Seventh, Jacob alleges the complaint of plaintiff is in bad
faith.

On June 4, 2003, Haynes replied to the counterclaim.
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On August 27, 2003, Haynes moved to consolidate docket
number 000600299 into this case.

That case was entitled Triple H

Ranch LC v Fern J. Boyer, Gerald G. Boyer, Gregory J. Boyer,
Karel J. Snyder, H.S. Hansen, Helen Blonquist, Alfred C.
Blonquist, Barbara Hall and Kevin Hall, defendants and third
party plaintiffs vs. Haynes Land & Livestock, Lydia 0. Stillman
dba Stillman Seven, Jacob Family Chalk Creek, Limited, Catherine
B. Christensen, LLC, B.A. Bingham & Sons LLC, Chalk Creek
Hoytsville Water Users Corp, Summit County, and State of Utah
Department of Fire, Forestry and State Lands, third party
defendants.

The court issued a ruling and order September 23,

2003, consolidating the cases as the motion was unopposed. The
court asked that an order be prepared but it was not provided
until April 11, 2005, when it was signed by the court. Based on
stipulation in June 2005 a scheduling order was entered.
That complaint, now consolidated into this case, alleges
Triple H has an undivided 11/36 interest in property between the
Haynes and Jacob properties, Fern Boyer has 3/40, Gerald Boyer
3/40, Gregory Boyer 1/10, Karel Snyder 1/36, J.S. Hansen 1/6,
Helen Blonquist has a claimed interest in the property, Helen
Blonquist as trustee has a 1/6 interest, Alfred Blonquist has an
undivided 1/12 interest, and defendants Barbara and Kevin Hall
may claim an interest in property in this Chalk Creek area in the
west half of the Northeast quarter and the northeast quarter of
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the Northwest quarter of Section 34 Township 2 North Range 8
East, SL Base and Meridian, with exceptions.

The complaint was

under Title 78 Chapter 39 and seeks partition by sale for the
common benefit of all parties who own that property. It further
alleges the property involved consists of 5 non-contiguous
parcels, no party has any easements, partition without sale is
impossible, and plaintiff asks for a decree determining the
respective rights of the parties to the property, that it be sold
subject to exceptions, and that the proceeds be applied to costs
and attorney fees and then distributed according to the interests
of the parties in the property.
An amended answer and counterclaim was filed in July 2005
pursuant to stipulation.

The amended answer and counterclaim

adds as another counterclaim the named defendants in what was
formerly docket no. 000600299.

It contains the same basic causes

of action but alleges against all defendants and seeks
declaratory judgment (1) against all counterclaim defendants that
the road is a public road from the 1800s and Class D county road
since 1978 (2) that the road is an RS 2477 road as against all
counterclaim defendants, (3) that Jacob has a prescriptive
easement against all defendants except Summit County for purposes
of, among other things, livestock grazing, hunting, fishing,
camping, snowmobiling, picnicking, recreational enjoyment, and
the construction and use of cabins, (4) that Jacob has an
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easement by necessity against Haynes and the State because when
the property was sold by Wright in about 1938 Jacob was given no
express easement and Jacob has no other access and Jacob is
landlocked without the easement.

A conservation easement was

granted to the State in 1999 on part of Haynes property and that
easement was taken by the State subject to Jacob's right to use
the road, (5) as against Haynes and the State that Jacob has been
granted an express but restricted easement in 1939 to use the
road for moving livestock and related equipment and the express
easement is subject to reasonable expansion to accommodate
reasonable use and enjoyment of the benefitted land as noted in
the third cause of action above, and (6) trespass as against
Haynes in that Jacob owns an interest in the land and Haynes is
threatening and attempting to block access and is thus
trespassing and Jacob and Garff have been damaged in an amount to
be proven, and (7) Haynes is acting in bad faith by bringing its
complaint and Jacob has had to defend against a frivolous suit.

On August 1, 2005, Bingham, one of the consolidated third
party defendants filed an answer.

On August 4, 2005, Summit County filed an answer to the
counterclaim.
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Williams filed an answer August 15, 2005, as well as a cross
claim.

Jacob answered November 9, 2005.

The State filed an answer August 30, 2005, and Chalk CreekHoytsville Water Users filed an answer on September 15, 2005.

Other defendants filed various answers, some indicating no
interest in the lawsuit. Hall filed a disclaimer April 6, 2006.

Jacob filed a motion for partial summary judgment on
September 8, 2006, as the next pleading.

The court heard

arguments on that matter on March 19, 2007, after extensions were
granted for delayed briefing, and issued a Ruling and Order
denying the motion on the public road issue on March 29, 2007.

Since that time various discovery disputes have arisen and
this trial date was scheduled.

On October 3, 2007, the undersigned judge and court staff
accompanied counsel and various others on a day-long journey to
the property at issue, crossing the Haynes and Jacob properties
while counsel and others pointed out various sites.

That "field

trip" was not on the record though the court's clerk was present
and made some minutes which are part of the file. The court, for
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its own information and memory, took some photographs which it
retains as an aid to recollection of the area. Those are not part
of the record though numerous photographs taken by the parties
were introduced and received at trial.

On January 15, 2008, the parties stipulated that the trial
would proceed on the issues dealing with the parties' rights to
use of the roadways, and to defer trial of any other issues
dealing with partition of the Boyer property until after this
trial.

On January 25, 2008, the court signed an order based on
stipulation of the parties that Jacob Family Chalk Creek LLC be
substituted as defendant, counterclaim plaintiff, and third party
defendant in place of the previously named limited partnership.

The court on January 30, 2008, denied the request of Haynes
and the State to postpone the trial awaiting Utah Supreme Court
rulings.

In fact the Utah Supreme Court issued the anticipated

rulings dealing with public roads on February 12, 2008.

The court heard evidence, received exhibits, heard argument

-10-

of counsel, received pre-trial briefs, visited the site, received
post-trial briefs, and is fully advised. The court took the
matter under advisement.

It does not appear as if the facts are in great dispute, but
the legal consequences of those facts is where this dispute is
centered.

The court finds as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The nature of the parties appears, without serious
dispute, to be as follows.
2. Plaintiffs are Haynes Land and Livestock, Triple H Ranch
LC, and Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users.

Haynes is a general

partnership and owns property in Summit County.

All property at

issue is located in TIN R8E, T2N R8E, T2N R7E and T3N R7E, as
described in Exhibit AA attached to Haynes Trial Brief.

The

Haynes property comprises just under 10,000 acres.
Triple H is a limited liability company and it owns an
undivided one third interest in the Boyer-Triple H property
(Boyer property)in T2 R8 Section 34.

Water Users is a

corporation and it owns property also in Section 34.
Jacob Family Chalk Creek LLC is a limited liability company
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and Catherine B. Christensen LLC is as well, and each owns an
undivided one half interest in the approximately 10,000 acres as
fully described in Exhibit DD to plaintiffs' trial brief, land
mostly to the west and south of the Haynes property. Throughout
this decision the court will normally call the Jacot-Christensen
entities "Jacob."

That is not done to imply Jacob is more

important than Christensen, but is simply shorter than writing
Jacob-Christensen so frequently.

On occasion, such as describing

cabins, the court will use the Jacob cabin, or the Christensen
cabin and so forth.

Whenever "Jacob" is used, unless the context

shows otherwise, the court is referring to the Jacob-Christensen
entities and families.
Garff is a family member of the Jacob entities who has
attempted to build a cabin on the Jacob property.
Bingham & Sons owns property between SR 133 and the Haynes
property.

Stillman owns property nearby.

Fern Boyer, Gerald

Boyer, Gregory Boyer, J.S. Hansen, and Alfred Blonquist own an
undivided 2/3 interest in combination with Triple H of what is
called the Boyer property in Section 34 T2 R8.
Summit Count claims an interest in the Class D road and the
State of Utah claims a grantee's right in the conservation
easements involved or to be involved.
3. This dispute concerns historic routes to travel across
property owned by Haynes and whether that travel is over a public
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road, whether that travel is permissible and governed by some
form of easement, or whether access across Haynes' property is
more limited.

Other subsidiary issues abound concerning use by

others as well.
4. All references are to the Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
and this land involves three townships, TIN, T2N or T3N, and
Ranges 7E or 8E.

Throughout, these will be short handed to Tl,

T2, or T3, R7 or R8 together with the appropriate section number.
From Coalville, Utah, the county seat of Summit County,
heading basically eastward is SR 133, commonly called the Chalk
Creek Road. That road travels easterly and eventually leads, over
unimproved roads east of the area of concern in this case, to
Wyoming and other areas of Utah. Leaving SR 133 approximately 18
miles east of Coalville in a south easterly direction, Haynes and
Jacob each own substantial property (approximately 10,000 acres
each).

The chain of titles will be discussed but in essence

Haynes bought property closest to SR 133 in the 1930s and 1940s.
Further removed from SR 133 Jacob also owns substantial property,
and the Boyer parties own property consisting of substantially
smaller acreage in a Section bounded by the Haynes property and
the Jacob property.

To get to their property Jacob has to cross

the Haynes property, as do the Boyers to get to their property.
Now disputes have arisen about the nature of that use and whether
the routes traveled to gain access is a public road or whether
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Haynes ownership of the property is subject to certain types of
easements in favor of Jacob or Boyer. Up to the day of trial
there evidently was an issue as to whether any access was allowed
by Boyer and it is Haynes position still at trial Boyer has no
easement to gain access to the Boyer property.
5. From SR 133 a road crosses property owned by Bingham.
That road goes for approximately one quarter mile and then leads
onto the Haynes property as shown on X117 on T3 R7 Sec. 35.
Interestingly, alL involved including Haynes have used this road
and Bingham, the owner, evidently has never attempted to stop
such use from SR L33 and Bingham did not participate in this
trial.

All involved have evidently treated this first quarter

mile or so as always being open to the public.

The road shown on

that map X117 shows where the current course of that road in
orange.

The road at that point is commonly called the Bench Road

or historically Sage Brush Flats, and it travels onto Haynes
property in T3 R7 Section 35.

There is now a locked gate and

fence with severaL signs basically stating No Trespassing or
Private Property. That gate is in Section 35 as above. The
particulars of the beginnings of those signs and gate are in some
dispute. The road at issue then travels further onto and through
Haynes property easterly onto T3 R7 Section 36, then turns
southerly onto T2 R8 Section 1.

It splits in T2 R8 Section 7,

and the "main" or Bench Road at issue goes southerly still across
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Haynes property through T2 R8 Sections 7 and 18 until the Jacob
property begins at T2 R8 Section 19 immediately south of Section
18.

At that point the road has commonly (and will be herein)

called the Middle Fork Road.

The land becomes more mountainous

and less level. Thus, at T2 R8 the property line between Haynes
and Jacob is the section line between Sections 18 and 19.

The

Middle Fork Road continues south easterly on Jacob's property
through T2 R8 Sections 19, 20, 29, 32, 33 and into Tl R8 Section
4, which is toward the south end of the Jacob property.

At

approximately that area Jacob and Christensen have built some
cabins to be discussed below.

The road then travels north

easterly back through T2 R8 Section 33 and onto T2 R8 Section 34
where lakes are located as discussed in the next paragraph.

The

Boyer property at issues is all within T2 R8 Section 34, bounded
on the north, south and west by Jacob property and on the north
and east by the Haynes property.
6. At the split in T2 R8 Section 7 back to the north what is
called the East Fork Road (or East Fork Loop) travels easterly
and somewhat southerly, across T2 R8 Sections 8, 9, and 15 and
then turns south and crosses T2 R8 Sections 22, 23, 26 and 27,
all still on Haynes property, where it veers a bit west onto the
Jacob property at T2 R8 Section 27, just north of and near what
are called Joyce Lake and Boyer Lake or Boyer Reservoir located
within T2 R8 Section 34.

The road from the East Fork then
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continues southerly across the Boyer property in T2 R8 Section
34, crosses the reservoir and travels south westerly onto the
Jacob property.

Thus, considering the Middle Fork Road until it

reaches the Boyer property, and the East Fork Road until it
reaches the Boyer property, the named aspects of this road "meet"
and a loop is formed.

The entire road has in the past been

called the East Fork of Chalk Creek, as it is in the East Fork
Chalk Creek drainage, but the terminology used in this paragraph
will be used throughout this Memorandum Decision to mean the
Bench Road on the Haynes property from the northern beginning
point in T3 R7 Section 35 until the property line between Haynes
and Jacob at T2 R3 Sections 18 and 19.

Thereafter the road will

be called the Middle Fork from T2 R8 Section 19 all through the
Jacob property until it reaches the Boyer property on T2 R8
Section 34.

On the Boyer property the road will be called the

Boyer road.

Continuing from there at the north end of the Boyer

property in Section 34 T2 R8 on the Haynes property the road will
be called the East Fork Road until it "rejoins" the Bench Road in
T2 R8 Section 7.
7. There is another road, which the court will call the West
Fork Road, about which there seems little dispute.

It leaves the

Bench Road on Haynes property in T2 R8 Section 18 and branches
off to the west and mostly south, onto Jacob property at T2 R8
Section 19 and then remains on the Jacob property to the southern
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border of Jacob's property at Tl R7 Section 12.
8. The issues in this case concern the entire loop.

Jacob

and Boyers and Summit County contend the entire loop is a public
road, including the Bench Road, Middle Fork Road, Boyer Road, and
East Fork Road.

Haynes and the State of Utah assert none of it

is a public road but there is a prescriptive easement in favor of
Jacob but none in favor of Boyer.
9. At the beginning of trial plaintiffs conceded for the
first time in an oral stipulation that Jacob could have an
agricultural and recreational easement over Haynes' property
along the Bench Road and East Fork Road consistent with the
historical use including oil and gas exploration but that use
does not include use for the fourth, or Garff, cabin erected on
the Jacob property, to be discussed below. Jacob accepted the
stipulation but of course urged it does not go far enough and
Jacob has additional rights of use and Jacob claims the entire
road is public.
10. Most of this land was once owned by the Wright Brothers
who conveyed various portions at various times to both Haynes and
the predecessors of Jacob.

In the mid 1930s various parcels were

conveyed as shown on X300.

The portions conveyed to Wasatch

Livestock later basically became the Jacob property.
11. In 1932 Haynes, through Howard Hayes Sr, acquired the
northern half of Section 36, T3 R7, as well as T2 R8 Sections 9,
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15, 22, 23, 26, 35 as well as the eastern half of Section 27,
some of Section 34 except the Boyer property, and the eastern
half of Section 3 Tl R8.

Thus, Haynes bought in 1932 what is the

northern portion of its current property, approximately 6200
acres more or less.

Thus, the Bench Road crossed Haynes property

only on Section 36 of T3 R7.

The remainder of the Bench Road,

Section 35 of T3 R7, T2 R7 Section 1, T2 R8 Sections 7 and 18,
went across land owned by others, not Haynes, until Haynes bought
those portions, along with the southern half of Section 8 T2 R8
in about 1941. Specifically, as shown on X204, Haynes bought the
south half of Section 36 T3 R7 and T2 R7 Section 1 in 1940 and
Sections 7, 17, and 18 and most of Section 8 T2 R8 in 1941.
12. Triple H and the Boyers own undivided interests in
Section 34 T2 R8. The land surrounds the Boyer Reservoir in
Section 34 T2 R8. X116 shows the non-contiguous nature of the
Boyer property within Section 34 T2 R8.

The property basically

surrounds the Boyer Reservoir owned and operated by the Chalk
Creek-Hoytsville Water Users. The Boyers owned the land on which
the Boyer Reservoir sits in Section 34 T2 R8, and it was formerly
the Boyer Lake, one of three lakes comprising the Blue Lakes.
The Boyers in 1903 filed a notice of appropriation for storage of
water in a reservoir. The Boyer family received patent in 1914 to
the Boyer property at issue and conveyed some of it to the Chalk
Creek Reservoir Company for purposes of the reservoir. That
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entity conveyed approximately 83 acres to the Chalk CreekHoytsville Water Users. A right of way was acquired in 1934 from
the Wright Brothers. X6. After conveying the reservoir land to
what is now known as the Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users,
Boyers retained the land around the Boyer Reservoir as shown on
X116.

Triple H was formed in 2000 to purchase some of that land

and now owns an approximate 1/3 undivided interest in what is
called herein the Boyer property in Section 34.
13. Haynes thus owns the land over which the Bench Road and
the East Fork Road travel, and Haynes claims there are only three
exceptions to Haynes record title: (1) the stipulated
prescriptive easement in favor of Jaoob, (2) the easement created
by the deeds, X6-X9, for limited livestock usage, and (3) an
easement for the Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users (Water Users)
to construct and maintain the reservoir, Boyer Reservoir.
14. Jacob bought its property, which again is to the south
and west of Haynes property, from Wasatch Livestock, which was
run by Irv Jacob.

The Jacob property is again owned by the LLC

and the Christensen LLC as equal undivided interest owners. It
was purchased in the name of Jacob and Christensen in October
1938.
15. Once acquired the properties were basically run and
managed by the parents of the current disputants.

Howard Haynes

Sr ran the Haynes property and his son and sibling Shirley

-19-

MacFarlane now basically operate the Haynes Land and Livestock
LLC. Joe Jacob, the son of Irv Jacob, basically ran and operated,
along with his siblings, the Jacob property during the time
Howard Haynes, Sr, operated the Haynes property.
Sr. died in 1979.
died.

Howard Haynes

The testimony did not show when Joe Jacob

The issues have arisen, as is always the case, in more

recent times now that the "original" owners are not involved.
16. For the basically 40 years Haynes Sr operated the ranch
sheep and cattle grazed the area, some belonging to Haynes, some
under lease, and various wildlife operations were allowed to use
the property under contract as well.

Beginning in about 1978

Haynes allowed his property to be used as what was called a
Posted Hunting Units.

Various "outfitters" or companies would

lease the land and charge customers to buy permits to hunt for a
fee.

Those people who hunted under the PHU, which later became

Cooperative Wildlife Management Units, or CWMUs, were allowed on
the property since 1978 until the present, on the Haynes
property, to hunt deer, elk and other wildlife.

Those lessees

guarded the gates and checked during hunting season (basically
August through October), as best they could, to determine that
those on the Haynes land had permits. Some people, those who drew
public permits, were guided. During that time frame perhaps 100
people a year counting guests used the property of Haynes.

There

were permits for on average 40-50 animals per year, and two could
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go in the hunting party and others could stay in the campgrounds.
They could bring RVs, ATVs, tents, campers, horses, and so forth.
Most of the property is not fences though some is.

Haynes has

several "cross fences'" on its property and some gates protected
by "cattle guards."

There is a fence between some of the Haynes

and Jacob property at Sections 18-19 as discussed herein.
17. Jacob has also leased its lands, or portions thereof,
for various others to run sheep and other livestock, as well as
their own sheep and livestock in the past.
cabins on their property as well.

Jacob has built

These uses will be discussed

further below.
18. The court intends to find facts chronologically to
explain its conclusions. To begin much before this litigation
before statehood in 1896 all of these lands belonged to the
United States and were part of the public domain. The "land use
policy" of the United States was that the lands could be used by
about anyone for about any purposes without permits, permission,
or concern for the finite nature of resources.

People could

timber and hunt and graze livestock without regard to about
anything.

The even numbered sections were public land and the

odd sections were public land until 1869 when they were acquired
by the railroads.

According to the title examination, X35, title

to almost all of these relevant sections in this area vested in
the State of Utah upon achieving statehood in 1896, and various
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patents were granted to railroads as well and some lots were
selected by Utah for various purposes such as a reform school, a
permanent reservoir, and other purposes.

There was no evidence

that the railroad ever did anything with any of the sections
involved in this area and the ownership of the railroads ceased
just after 1900.
19. Jacob claims the historical evidence shows the entire
road, the entire loop involved is a public road under law and
Haynes asserts it is not.

Many historical documents, all hearsay

but admissible under varying exceptions, were received and have
been reviewed.
20.

Many historical documents were received, plaintiffs

having stipulated they were admissible as far as being authentic
and being exceptions to the hearsay rule.

Plaintiffs objected as

they were not relevant given that they could not produce
sufficient proof by the necessary quantum of proof that this road
was a public road.

The court allowed admission of the documents

and will briefly summarize as part of its findings those most
heavily relied on by Jacob.
21. A probate court entry from March of 1862 shows someone
requested permission to take timber out of "East Kanyon" and to
make a road.

The court finds this is not convincing that this

was in the drainage area of the East Fork of Chalk Creek but it
does show that the public was, at that time, enabled to obtain
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timber at will from the public lands.
22.

In 1865 a probate court docket minute entry shows

approval was given for persons to take timber from Chalk Creek
and have a saw mill. Again that does not demonstrate to this
court by clear and convincing evidence this road at issue was
involved as Chalk Creek could be any of the many miles now called
Chalk Creek.

It again shows some evidence, however, that the

public was using the public lands.

That court entry showed L.L.

Randall and Jacob Huffman wanted a saw mill and those names will
be found later herein. A 1947 historical text, X137, shows at
page 139 that L.L. Randall had one of the first saw mills two
miles from Pine Cliff, and that is in this area. Pine Cliff is
along SR 133 just east and north of where this Bench Road leaves
SR 133. Randall's homestead, discussed later, was along Bench
Road in T2 R8 Section 18.

X158 confirms Huffman operated a saw

mill on the East Fork.
23. Court minute entries from December 1866 and 1867 show
two other requests in "Echo Kanyon" and Cache Cove for a "herd
ground."' This is not convincing to the court as being in this
immediate area though it again shows the public nature of the
public lands and general area.
24. Official government surveys from the time are convincing
to the court.

X109 shows quite clearly the area of T3 R7 Section

35, where the current Bench Road leaves SR 133 going southward.
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Other maps and notes from this 1874 survey (the survey was in
1873 and the resulting map from 1874, so those dates are largely
interchangeable), combined with the stipulated expert report of
Matthew Liapis, X296, show that there was a road in 1874 along
what is now called the Bench Road and Middle Fork Road.
25. In summary, that expert report shows Liapis attempted to
determine if the 1873 and 1893 surveys described herein
correspond to the current road at issue.
from 1874 and 1894.

He used the survey maps

He consulted other experts, he toured the

area and used other filed survey notes. He concluded the maps
from the 1800s show the road then was substantially similar to
the current Bench Road and Middle Fork Road with some fairly
minor variations.

He noted the surveyors in that time often did

not venture into the interior of a section but only noted the
roads along the section boundaries and basically "filled in" the
area where the road probably went in the interior of a section.
26. The survey notes from 1873 (the 1874 survey map) show a
saw mill along the East Fork, T2 R8 Section 7, shown on X117 at
Point A.
27. A probate court minute entry of 1869 shows U.S.
Surveyors were in Chalk Creek and the court asked a group of men
to assist. X242.
28. A territorial map from 1874 and 1875 shows a "saw mill"
in this rough vicinity of these properties but it is impossible
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to tell from that map precisely where the noted saw mill was
located. X163, X164.
29. In a court minute entry of 1879 L.L. Randall and others
sought permission to divert water in Chalk Creek. X. 234.
30. L.W. Randall applied for a homestead in 1896, indicating
he had been living there since 1885, and he had improved the
property and was he given a patent in 1903. X. 120. That is shown
on Point F in X117 in Section 18 near the Bench Road.
31 . In 1895 W.H. Staley applied for a homestead in Section
18 T2 R8, indicating he had resided there since 1883, and he made
improvements and irrigated and built corrals and such and he was
given a patent in 1901.1 That is shown as being near the Bench
Road on X117 at Point E in Section 18 T2 R8.
32. A U.S. Survey Sectional and Mineral map of 1875 shows a
cabin where Point K on X117 is shown, near the current Middle
Fork Road on the southern end of the Jacob property.
33. In 1895 George Huff applied for a homestead,

!

indicating

While these accounts of this time and place fascinate most
and may cause many to wish for those "good old days'' when a
person could begin living in an area and create a homestead
there obviously was a down side. A newspaper article from July
1886 demonstrates that perhaps those days, while they had their
glory and glamor, were not all so good. William Staley,
according to the report, in the course of 10 days lost two sons
and a daughter to "that dreadful disease diphtheria." The article
states "The unfortunate family a short time ago had a new home
burnt to the ground.
Their lot seems more than human nature can
bear." William Staley's brother, M.H. Staley a few days later
lost two children, ages 3 and 5, to the disease. All 5 deaths
were within the space of two weeks.
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he had been living there since 1894, and he was granted a patent
in 1901. X. 121. That was in Section 8 T2 R8, at Point B on X117.
34. A court minute entry of 1894 indicated the prosecuting
attorney should prosecute anyone who has been blocking public
highways in any of the canyons in Summit County which have been
used for 7 years.

This does not directly relate to this area but

again shows the public nature of the canyons to some extent.
35. A Coalville Times newspaper article from August 1895
indicated that about 40,000 sheep had been "dipped" and about
100,000 were expected at Clark's corral.

These numbers were to

some extent corroborated by X401-405, which showed at Coalville
(the county seat) the tax records for 1993 show some 200,000
sheep were taxed as having been brought into Summit County for
summer grazing.

This is some corroboration that a large number

of sheep were in the area but does not show the number of sheep
specifically in Chalk Creek. Another article from the next year,
1896, also indicated 100,000 sheep were dipped at Clark's.
Clark's dipping corral was in T2 R8 Section 19, now on the Jacob
property, very near the Middle Fork Road shown on X117 at J.
Dipping of sheep occurred by having the sheep in essence "bathed"
in a chemical, creosote, to keep the flies off them.
36. Charles Saxton applied for a homestead in Section 8 Ts
R8 indicating he had moved there in 1896.
patent.

He was later given a

X. 122. That is in Section 8 T2 R8 south of the current
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East Fork Road.
38. Various news articles from the late 1890s show various
people had killed bear in the East Fork of Chalk Creek (this
entire area) but none show the specific use of any particular
roads.

Those articles show use by persons in the area on public

lands but are not convincing that any particular road was used.
39. A USGS survey map of 1903 shows the Bench Road and the
Middle Fork Road to an area which appears to the court to be Tl
R8 Section 4 and possibly into T2 R8 Section 33, north and west
of the Boyer Reservoir. It also shows the East Fork Road
terminating in the middle of Section 8 of T2 R8. The roads as
shown on that map are reflected in X296, Attachment H.

The court

finds that map particularly compelling.
40. In 1902 William Boyer, according to a public record
(X123) applied to divert water from what appears to be the
current dam at Boyer Reservoir, then called Boyer Lake, in the
north east quarter of the north west quarter of Section 34 T2 R8,
the site of the Boyer property and current Boyer Reservoir.
41. In 1913 a record from the Summit County Commission shows
that on November 5, 1913, the commission authorized the
expenditure of county funds for improvement of the Sage Brush
Flat road in Chalk Creek. Again, as found, Sage Brush Flats was
the name of part of the area the court now calls Bench Road. The
court finds this evidence refers to the Bench Road area. X244.
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43. A Summit County map from the county surveyor in 1918,
without a legend, seems to show a dotted line on, as best the
court can determine, the rough area of Bench Road and the Middle
Fork Road, again appearing to terminate at the south end of the
Jacob property in Section 4 of Tl R8.

The East Fork Road appears

also to be depicted, again terminating in about the middle of
Section 8 T2 R8. X. 166.
44. In a Utah Historical Society paper written in 1983 on
the life of Lady Homesteader Myrtle Rigby it was described how
she settled in the Chalk Creek area and in the summers frequent
city visitors arrived, teams and horses prepared, and everyone
was off to Blue Lake or Bear River to fish.

This is again not

specific as to any particular route or road but it does show use
of the public of this area on public land. X160
45. A 1925 U.S. Forest Service map, X167, is claimed by
Jacob to show the road.

The court cannot decipher the map

provided and cannot find the road referenced.
46. X168, a U.S. Forest Service map of 1929 appears to show
a trail, depicted on the legend as lower than a good or poor
motor road and lower than a "Road Not Passable by Motor" roughly
in the area of what appears to the court to be the Bench Road and
the Middle Fork Road.

It appears to show the entire loop, but it

shows no lakes and does not appear to the court to be the same as
the other maps showing the East Fork Road. A map from 1931, X169,
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appears to show the same thing. A 1935 Forest Service map appears
to show the same thing. X170. In 1942 a similar map shows the
same loop road but it is on the legend as a "poor" motor vehicle
road. X171.
47. In a Summit County Commission meeting of September 1947
(X 133) a Fish and Game Warden named Ira Page appeared and made a
statement that Haynes had closed the road to Blue Lake and that
road had been used by the public for a long time and the matter
was referred to the County Attorney.
48. At various times earlier various news articles and
journal entries showed people were in this vicinity engaged in
various activities. The court will not identify each date
involved but in summary they showed as follows.

Sheep herders

from the hills came to dances at Upton, on SR 133 a few miles
from the entry point to the Bench Road off SR 133, but there is
no indication as to how those people traveled to get to Upton or
precisely where they came from, but the court finds there is some
inference they went on a road rather than through the deep forest
or over cliffs or across creeks or streams. Sawmills were clearly
present in the area in 1881. A man was lost in 1890 in the East
Fork drainage area and a search posse was sent for him, but there
is no indication of precisely where nor what routes were used. In
1881 a news paper article showed a person from Upton was killed
in a wagon accident 13 miles south east of Upton, which would be
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in this area, after visiting a saw mill in the area.

This shows

persons from Upton visited this East Fork area. X145.
49. Numerous people testified at trial about their comings
and goings after these parties acquired their properties in the
1930s and early 1940s. While the court was aware of the objection
of Haynes the court allowed the testimony over the relevance
objection of Haynes, indicating it would hear the evidence and
determine if it was relevant. It was necessary for the court to
hear the evidence as a whole before the court could determine if
it was persuasive.

The testimony was all relevant as it tended

to prove an issue in the case, namely, who had used this road and
under what conditions.
50. William L. Christensen is the a grandson of A.E.
Christensen, the grantee from Wasatch Livestock of what is now
the Jacob property.

He began going to this area and the Jacob

property in the late 1930s as a young man, having been born in
1932.

He went with his father.

After leaving the county road,

SR 133, Chalk Creek Road, they would take a road and travel it
until they came to the Jacob property. The court finds that was
along the Bench Road. He saw no gates, locked or unlocked after
leaving the highway.

He did recall seeing a sawmill on the Jacob

property about 1940.

After his father died in 1945 he did not go

to the property until the 1960s, after serving in the military
and after being married and having children.
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A cabin had been

built by the Jacob family, as distinguished from the Christensen
family, in about 1948 and he went regularly to use that cabin and
enjoy the property.

He began to see gates on the Haynes property

in the 1960s. There were signs put up by Joe Jacob on the HaynesJacob property line (between Sections 18-19of T2 R8) and he
recalls them in the 1960s.

He participated in the planning of

what is called the Christensen cabin in the early 1970s and there
were no restrictions on travel or construction equipment along
the Bench Road or Middle Fork Road.

He is familiar with Jacob

having commissioned an oil and gas exploration and the big trucks
that used the area and the Bench Road and Middle Fork Road for
that purpose without difficulty. He participated in a meeting in
1984 when Haynes, through Howard Haynes Jr., began to be upset
about usage of the road.

From that X255 was created, an

agreement about use of the road, the so-called 1984 Agreement.
The cabins built by Jacob and later the Christensens are located
at approximately Point K on X117 in Section 4 Tl R8. He saw signs
periodically in various places concerning trespassing and such
but paid them no mind as he and his family always believed they
had full access to the Bench Road and Middle Fork Road.

On one

occasion in the 1960s Howard Haynes Sr was stationed by the fence
then existing off SR 133 and he allowed Christensen to pass after
Christensen presented a note from Joe Jacob explaining who he,
William Christensen, was. The 1960s is also the first time he
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recalls seeing a fence between the Haynes-Jacob properties on
sections 18-19 T2 R8. He recalls the road being narrow from the
1930s and early 1940s, with ruts if the weather was bad, and that
was so until perhaps the 1970s. He felt there was no limitation
on the use of the road and that it was always a public road.

At

some point there was a gate and locks and Joe Jacob gave
Christensen either a key or a combination to enter onto the
Haynes property off SR 133. He assumed it was a public road until
the 1960s when it became private.

He never kept the Boyers off

the Jacob property.
51.

William E. Christensen, son of William L. Christensen,

testified the family wants to be free to develop the property as
the Summit County zoning ordinances will allow, but the
Christensens do not plan on having a big development but want to
build other family cabins on their land.

He has often hunted,

fished, and otherwise recreated, at various times, and has taken
many guests and others have been along, including television
media trucks to film hunts and fishing activities on the Jacob
property.
graded.

No gates were locked before 1984.

The road was often

He has had as many as 400 guests on the Jacob property

and he nor those guests were never stopped. The Christensen
family wants a conservation easement and full access may be more
attractive economically if they are compensated for it.

Travel

was by the East Fork Road and Bench Road to the cabin areas.
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52.

Gary and Greg Boyer, brothers, own an interest in the

Boyer property, and Gary Boyer has studied the road issue by
examining historic documents for several hundreds of hours. He is
the son of Fay and Fern Boyer. The Boyers first bought land in
the area in 1905 and received patent in about 1913.

Gary has

been going to the area since he was a young man in the late
1950s, and since then he has been hundreds of times.

The Boyers

usually went on the East Fork Road, and Howard Haynes Sr. had
left a key under a rock so they could have access.

There was

another gate on the East Fork Road, just east of the split in the
loop, on Haynes property in Section 7 T2 R8. Until the 1980s the
main gate off SR 133 was not locked. There was a gate but it was
open.

The East Fork Road gate was first locked in the mid 1970s.

Gary has never been turned away, and he has taken groups of
people and none has ever been stopped from using the East Fork
Road.

Gary Boyer felt Haynes was attempting to block entry so he

began a study of the area.
was always public.

He has believed the Middle Fork Road

The Boyers would also like to build a cabin

on their property. Many, many photographs were received, X269293, X307, portions of X51, and others, each consisting of
multiple photos of various areas and portions of the road and
signs from the early 1970s until the present.

They show many of

the beauties of the area, as well as portions of the road. As
noted herein there are several photos from much earlier.
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53. In the late 1940s the Jacob f amily built a cabin, in the
area in Section 4 Tl R8, near the south end of their property,
west and south of Boyer Lake.
mid 1950s in the same area.

They built a second cabin in the
Zoning ordinances then were not what

they are now and almost no approval was needed and no inspections
occurred by county officials.

The Christensen family completed a

much larger cabin in the same vicinity in about 1974. Sometime in
the mid 1990s Garff began to build a cabin, what is called the
fourth or Garff cabin.

Garff evidently married a daughter of Joe

Jacob, though the court may be incorrect, but in any event Garff
is now a member of the Jacob family.

He obtained building

permits from Summit County and began building a large, 4500
square foot retreait/residence on the Jacob property not far from
the older Jacob cabins.

That event was evidently the impetus for

ths lawsuit which was filed in 1998.

That Garff cabin evidently

remains unfinished and little or no evidence was presented
respecting this building.

The court did observe it from a

distance on the October 2007 field trip but paid little attention
to its level of completion and the court is unaware as to the
status of the interior of the facility.
53. Charles Horman married into the Christensen family.

He

first went to the Jacob property in 1965, and he drove the roads
in a passenger vehicle. He has been there often and frequently
uses the property.

He was basically in charge of building the

-34-

Christensen cabin, near point K on X117, in the early 1970s.

It

is approximately 5000 square feet, with 6 bedrooms and many, many
bunk beds, and it is designed as a family retreat.

It was built

in the Summer months of 1972-1974, by using a crew of 5.

It

involved the normal construction equipment, including a large
crane, cement trucks, 10 wheel dump trucks, front end loaders and
heavy excavation equipment.

He does not recall ever being asked

to leave nor did the work crews ever experience any event wherein
Haynes asked them to leave.

Horman has used the property often

and has often had large numbers of guests for church and youth
gatherings at this cabin, and none were ever asked to leave the
Haynes property or were they turned away.

All material for the

Christensen cabin was hauled to the site over the Haynes property
on the Bench Road and Middle Fork Road and there was never any
issue raised about usage of that road. Horman is aware of the
1984 agreement and after that he found the main gate off SR 133
locked which closed the road leading from SR 133 to Haynes
property, and he removed the gate by force on two occasions,
believing the 1984 agreement allowed access.

He further

developed two retaining and fishing ponds on Section 31 of T2 R8,
and accessed those by what is called the West Fork Road, crossing
Haynes property with large equipment and a crew and those too had
free access across Haynes property along the Bench Road. Those
have been stocked with fish regularly, at least every other year,
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and private suppliers have been hired and have come to the Jacob
property to plant the fish across the Bench Road onto the West
Fork Road. Jacob, through Joe Jacob, put up signs on the gate
leading from Haynes Bench Road to the Middle Fork Road on Jacob
property, indicating private property and no trespassing.

There

is also a gate on the property line between the Boyer property by
Boyer Lake and the Jacob property, and that is to keep the water
users from the Jacob property. He never saw a gate locked between
1965 and 1975 onto the Haynes property. He graded the entire
road, the entire Loop, often during the 1970s.

During the 1980s

and into the early 1990s Alfred Blonquist, working at the time
for Geary Construction, was hired to grade the road and he did it
yearly along the entire loop.

Blonquist was hired by Jacob and

by the Hoytsville water users to do that work.
54.

The Jacobs have had a presence on their property also.

They too went often to the property and were never stopped, never
asked to leave.

They have brought large groups of people also,

church and youth groups, and have not been blocked from using the
Bench Road and Middle Fork Road.

They have invited various

others, such as pond inspectors when they built fishing ponds on
their property.

The Jacobs also testify there was never a locked

gate at entrance off SR 133 before 1984. There was one sign, X5132, on Middle Fork Road heading north off Jacob property to the
Haynes property.

It states "limited access road next 5.15 miles.
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No Hunting, No Trespassing.

Haynes Land & Livestock Co."

sign has been in place for some time.

That

That sign is seen one

leaves the Jacob property, off the Middle Fork Road, onto the
Haynes property, the Bench Road.

There was no testimony but the

court finds, based on its travel to the site with counsel, that
the distance between SR 133 and the boundary line between
Sections 18-19 is approximately 5 miles.
55. The 1984 Agreement, X255, is between Haynes and Jacob.
It, in summary, indicated Jacob had certain claims, Haynes
recognized the 1939 deed granting access, and stated Jacob could
have a right of way as described in the 1939 deed but Jacob
claimed further rights; Haynes was allowed to keep a gate but
would provide either 100 keys to Jacob or a combination allowing
access.

Jacob agreed to allow Haynes a perpetual easement and

right of access for irrigation purposes in sections 20 and 21.
Both parties reserved any rights they claim.
56. Robert Powell, not associated with either party, is a 79
year old man who grew up in the Coalville area on a small farm
and he often went to the East Fork drainage area. He went to the
area often with his father in their 1934 truck, and the road was
not blocked

nor was the gate locked.

They usually went to what

are called the Blue Lakes, which consist of what is now Boyer
Reservoir, Joyce Lake, and Blue Lake, which is east of Boyer
Reservoir in T2 R8 Section 35.

An incident he recalled in the
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1940s happened where some man, not identified, said the road was
private and Powell's father said it was not, it was open to all
and that he had used it for years. In 1965 Powell recalled the
gate being unlocked but locked in the 1980s.

He as never stopped

in his journeys. He did not describe the route of travel.
57. Kay Crittendon, not associated with any parties, is an
85 year old man and life long resident of Coalville. He often
fished at the Blue Lakes before 1935 and there were no gates or
fences and no signs, and that was true until 1941.

After 1935

his father did all the road work and helped build the Boyer
Reservoir.

He produced photographs from 1938 showing the East

Fork Road at section 8 ended there.

(X52-1 through 52-4,

originals returned to Crittendon and copies substituted in the
court record). His father cut the road east and south from the
middle of section 8 where the East Fork Road ended and helped
build what is now the current East Fork Road in 1938-1941.
Crittendon fished at those lakes after World War II and when more
people, sometimes called the "city savages," began to frequent
the area Howard Haynes Sr began to try to stop the invasion by
halting people at SR 133. Crittendon saw the dipping corrals in
Section 19 T2 R8 and observed them just off the road Middle Fork
Road.
58. Alfred Blonquist, one of the owners of the Boyer parcel,
was given a copy of a map before he bought the property.
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That

map, X205, shows the entire loop at issue was declared a Class D
county road in 1978.

That map's origin is unknown but it was

created and filed with the Utah Department of Transportation in
1978 pursuant to statute, now UCA 72-3-105.

There was no county

commission resolution or approval and no records appear to be
extant which shed any light on how that Class D map came into
being, it just exists and is on file with UDOT. It is also kept
available for the public with the Summit County Recorder. It
shows the entire loop is a Class D road since 1978.

A Class D

road is one that involves no maintenance by the county.
59. The deposition of Gwennola Blonquist, now deceased, was
received on behalf of Haynes. She was born 1912, lived in the
Coalville area until 1933, left, and returned in about 1940. As
a youth she and others went to the Blue Lakes without permission
and lots of people used the roads and those lakes.

They usually

went via East Fork Road but the deposition did not, to the court,
clearly identify the precise route. She saw Jimmy's saw mill and
corrals which were along the Bench and Middle Fork Road, saw no
signs or fences or gates, and all was open. Her family got lumber
from the area without permission though that route was not notes
as to how they got wherever they went.

Small boats were on the

lakes and were used by various people.
60. The deposition of Lamont Staley, born in 1927, was
received, as he now lives elsewhere. He lived in the area and
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also went with his father in the mid 1930s to the area.

They

found what they believed was the crumbled cabin of his
grandfather William by Red Hole Section 18, which is accessed by
the Bench Road. He went on scout trips in about 1935 to Blue Lake
without permission. He did not recall any gates and thinks it was
all open. His route was not well identified.
61. In March 2006 Haynes has petitioned, as shown in X134,
the Summit County Board of Commissioners

(SCBC) to vacate the

Class D road which has been on file with UDOT.
hearing the SCBC deferred action. X135.

In an April 2006

In September 2006 a

petition for reconsideration was filed by Haynes, and a hearing
was held February 14, 2007. X302, 260. The county has deferred
action until this litigation is resolved. After this court issued
its ruling denying Jacob's motion for summary judgment in March
2007 Haynes again wrote the SCBC in April 2007 asking for another
public hearing in May 2007. X303. That was evidently denied.
Another letter was sent by Haynes in July 2007 asking for a
public hearing. Another formal request was filed by Haynes in
August 2007 on behalf of Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users,
joined by Haynes and Triple H.

X304.

62. Haynes has placed some of their property in a
Conservation Easement in 1999. Haynes granted the easement to the
State of Utah who may monitor compliance and is to preserve the
Conservation Values of the property.
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Haynes reserved the right

to build structures on Section 18 T2 R8, Section 1 T2 R7,
including as many as 6 cabins of up to 2500 square feet, along
with out buildings. A Ranch Headquarters was allowed on Section 1
T2 R7 or Section 36 T3 R7, each such section being in the
northern portions of the Haynes property accessed by the Bench
Road.
63. There was ample contrary testimony from witnesses called
by Haynes to contradict the recent use of the road at issue, the
entire loop.
64. One of the current partners in Haynes, Howard Haynes,
Jr. MD, a man of 87, first went with his father to the property
in about 1934 after the northern portions were purchased in 1932.
He helped with the sheep and other chores, trailed (or drove) the
sheep from Tooele to this land for Summer grazing, and did many
tasks over the years. He testified at that time he believed the
intervening land (Sections 7, 8, 16, 17, and 18, T2 R8, not owned
by Haynes until about 1941), were crossed to get to the north
portion of the Haynes property under the assumption that there
was some sort of permission from the owners at the time.

The

East Fork Road ended at Section 8. The reservoir company
furthered the road to get to the reservoir, Boyer Reservoir. His
father kept the gate locked as much as possible with the intent
to keep people, the public, out.

He now runs the ranch with his

sister Shirley MacFarlane. The property was heavily guarded in
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hunting season, basically the Fall of each year, and the gate was
locked as much as possible. Haynes has built one cabin on the
property but the evidence did not reveal its location and the
court does not recall seeing it. The court does recall seeing a
small cabin off to the west of the Bench Road possibly in Section
18 or Section 7 T2 R8 and that may be the cabin referenced by the
testimony..

When problems began to arise in about 1981 he

entered into the 1984 agreement, X255.

Historically he recalls a

saw mill, called Jimmy's, near the Haynes-Jacob border by
Sections 18-19, and the Bench Road was well defined when the
property was first purchased when he first went there.
65. Haynes partner and sister Shirley MacFarlane, born in
1935, went often to the property and it was always gated, there
were signs, and it was guarded in hunting season.
66. That agreement, X255, basically gives Jacob the right to
use the Bench Road for the purposes in the deeds
(agricultural)and a key or combination system was put in place so
Jacob could use the road. Jacob gave Haynes an irrigation
easement on Section 20 and 21 to install a head gate. Each party
reserved any rights and claims it had.
67. A deposition of Leroy Meadows, age 85, was received and
considered.

He was a local man and visited often in the area.

He recalled a gate in about 1928, and always got permission from
Howard Haynes, Sr, to use the land, or from the Wright Brothers,
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the previous owners.
very primitive.

The East Fork Road was not a road and was

By reputation in the area the road, the entire

loop, was private and controlled by Haynes.
68. The

Clyde Collard deposition was also received.

He was

a man of age 86 when deposed in 2006 and he was familiar with the
area. He ran sheep on the Jacob property by lease, after World War
II. He recalled the gate being locked most of the time and Jacob
also had a locked gate leading to Jacob's property.

The East

Fork Road was hardly ever traveled.
69. Many others, including Thomas Moore, a part-time fire
marshal, were in the area since the 1970s and stated the gate off
SR 133 was locked and Haynes tried to keep people off the road.
Many others on behalf of Haynes testified concerning the road
recent years, since the 1960s or so. They have been on the
property and the main gate off SR 133 was usually locked and
Haynes attempted to keep people off the road.
70. In September 1998 the deputy county attorney for Summit
County wrote counsel for Haynes and stated the county took no
official position on whether the road at issue, the entire loop,
was or was not a public thoroughfare by operation of State
statute. That contrasts with the current Summit County position
which is that this entire loop road is a Class D county road and
a public road.
71. The road across the Boyer Reservoir, a portion of the
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Boyer Road, is only 12 feet wide.

It goes across the top of the

dam, which is inspected by state Department of Natural Resources
personnel.

It is classified as a high hazard dam should it fail.

Outlet issues have arisen and the State officials have indicated
the measuring devices need greater protection.
any traffic across the top of the dam.

They discourage

If the road remains those

dam officials recommend a 20-24 foot wide road at the top, which
would require substantial cost of approximately $900,000 to
change the Boyer Reservoir system.
72. The Water Users initiated litigation in 1939 to condemn
the land for what is called the Boyer Reservoir, though it was a
natural reservoir before, as well as seek the roadway on the East
Fork Road.

The jury awarded damages for that taking in 1942.

73. After all the conflicts in that testimony concerning the
use of the properties, the gates and locks and signs, the court
finds that after Howard Haynes Sr bought the final portion of the
Haynes property in 1941 the gates were locked most of the time
and it was the intent of Haynes to keep people off the property.
Further, after Joe Jacob bought the property from about the same
time frame in 1938 he locked the gate from Haynes property to the
Jacob property at Sections 18-19 T2 R8 and it was Jacob's intent
to keep the public off the property.

Factually since 1941 the

Bench Road and the Middle Fork Road and the East Fork Road have
been private roads and hove not become public roads through usage
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by the public since that time.
74. The court finds this road at issue is basically a
"summer'' road.

There was no direct testimony as to the amount of

snowfall at any given time but the court does not exist in a
vacuum and can take judicial notice, even without being

requested

to do so in a civil matter under URE, Rule 201, of facts
generally known.

The court is not taking judicial notice that

the road at issue is or is not passable at any given time, nor of
precisely how much snow there is at any particular time, but
there is a lot of snow this season and the court believes at this
elevation this road is not visible or accessible by motor vehicle
a good part of the year. Further, the court went on the "field
trip" on October 3, 2007, and had off-the-record discussions with
counsel.

From all of the descriptions of the use of this road,

it is clear that the "road" is not used when there is substantial
snow on the ground.

Snowmobiles have been alluded to in the

trial and on the field trip and clearly the snow fall in this
area prohibits use by motor vehicle when there is substantial
snow.

A snowmobile may ride "over" the road but not along it.

When the court went on the field trip there were patches of snow
on the north side of trees and hills and that was October 3,
2007.

The court was advised that the Jacob cabins are located at

approximately 9100 feet above sea level and at times they have
been completely covered by snow. During trial, in a recess off

-45-

the record, the court indicated somewhat jokingly to counsel it
would like to go back to the property, being aware there was
still substantial snow in the area.

The court was advised by

someone there was probably still approximately 10 feet of snow by
the Jacob cabins.

From all this, the court finds that whatever

use is and has been made of the road, that use by vehicles is
seasonal and basically non-existent when there is substantial
snowfall.

The lowest of the Haynes property is approximately

7500 feet above sea level.

Based on the above findings and discussion, the court makes
the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The court will discuss the law it is relying not in an
attempt to educate the parties or anyone else but itself. The
parties have filed helpful memoranda, but in an effort to
demonstrate why the court is concluding as it is the court
recites its understanding of the governing law.
2. Jacob's farst alternative relief is for the court to
declare this entue loop is a public road under law.

As noted in

the court's previous ruling in March 2007, the relative
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simplicity of what is called the Dedication Statute, UCA 72-5104, belies the difficulty of this case.

This case is a very,

very difficult case for the court and it is not a clear cut case
at all.

The court is attempting to follow the law and do equity

as the relief sought, declaration of a public road, is an
equitable remedy. Bertagnole

211,

213 (UT 1981).

v. Pine

Meadow Ranches,

639 P. 2d

The court is also trying to solve an ongoing

problem between the parties and is trying not to create
additional litigation.
3. The case, by its nature, is very difficult.

As has been

recognized in such "public road cases/' a trial court is given a
fair degree of discretion in determining the legal consequences
of the facts as found by the court because the legal requirements
are highly fact dependent and somewhat amorphous. Heber City
v.

Simpson,

942 P. 2d 307,

311

(UT.

Corp

1997) . These cases by their

nature, especially this one because Jacob has asked the court to
make a determination from a time beginning almost 150 years ago,
involve "reconstruction of historical facts concerning timing,
nature, and the extent of public usage. . . [W]itnesses are
required to dredge the recesses of their minds for aged memories.
. . . Trial courts should be permitted some rein to grapple with
the multitude of fact patterns that may constitute . . . " [a
public road]. Kohler

1996).

v. Martin,

916 P.2d

910,

912-913

(UT.

App.

Whether the facts show a public road is a question of fact
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and law which involves complex facts, evidentiary resolutions and
credibility determinations. The court finds and concludes in this
case there are very, very few credibility determinations at issue
of any importance. Almost all the witnesses are found to be
honest and credible and they saw events as they believed them to
be from their perspective.

Almost none of the court's decisions

are governed by credibility determinations.
4. This case is again made very difficult by the history
involved.

As found and discussed herein, the ^original" owners

back in the early 1940s were Howard Haynes Sr and Joe Jacob,
along with of course the Christensen family and other siblings of
those two principal operators of the land. Now a few generations
have passed and the offspring of those men are at odds.

The

problem has been discussed in many cases, such as Southern

Wilderness

Alliance

v. BLM, 425 F.3d

735 (10th Cir.

2005).

Utah

While

that case was in a differing context, the problem is now that
what was once used as part of the public lands is now in the
hands of private individuals.

The owners whose land is crossed

(Haynes) do not want their land disturbed, ruined, full of
strangers and "city savages" who may destroy the beauty and peace
of the area and interfere with a livestock business.

Indeed,

Shirley MacFarlane indicated that the Jacob property users were
using the Bench Road as a speed way and she feared for the safety
of the Haynes families.

The Jacobs on the other hand want to
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enjoy their property in the same fashion and be free to allow
their families, now growing larger just as the Haynes

families

are growing, to fully use and enjoy their land and not be stuck
with only the ability, figuratively, to herd sheep down the road.
The Jacobs and Christensens have built a few cabins and want to
build a few more.

The Haynes fear the Jacobs will build a

veritable city and those residents will have to cross the Haynes
land to get to that "city."

The Jacobs believe they have the

right to enjoy their property as they have done in the past and
that now means building some additional cabins for their
increasing family and does not mean having to use only the two
small cabins

(one is about 700 square feet and one 2500 square

feet) to attempt to house and provide a refuge and retreat for a
large family.

Each party clearly has a very profound sense of

right and entitlement and the court's determination will affect
these parties greatly, as well as several generations of their
families yet to come.
8. The case is again made more difficult because of the
nature of the claim of Jacobs, particularly its timing-that this
entire loop was and is a public road from over 100 years ago,
beginning perhaps as early as 1865, but certainly in the period
1880 to 1896. That obviously entails proof of facts mostly from
documents rather than live witnesses.

No witnesses appeared, nor

could any be expected to, who were alive before 1896.
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Further,

Haynes argued correctly that it could not possibly prove a
negative from that time frame.

Proving a negative is at best

difficult and from this time frame may well be impossible. As
noted by the court in the summary judgment determination, it
would be highly unlikely to find a government record or newspaper
article from, for example, 1892, indicating that no one used the
East Fork loop this season.

It is, of course, not the burden of

Haynes to disprove public use but it is the burden of Jacob to
prove public use and all that those elements entail.
9. This case is also somewhat unique in that it is from a
time when the lands at issue were in the public domain.

As

found, prior to statehood in 1896, all of these sections and
lands at issue, all of them, were in the public domain. The even
numbered sections belonged to the United States and in 1869 the
odd numbered sections belonged to the railroads through a grant
from the United States.

From that time (1869) until about

statehood in 1896, the odd numbered sections belonged to the
railroads.

The only odd numbered sections involved as far as

public use in this case has been principally Section 7. Most of
the cases the courts have considered involved a private party
seeking to have a road that passes over the private property of
another declared public.

This case differs in that most

important regard.
10. This case is also complicated for the court in that the
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parties, respectfully, all seemed to concentrate on the entirety
of the road, the entire loop, without any emphasis on any
particular portion of the road. The court believes the evidence
was such that the parties probably could have and should have
focused on a more discrete portion of the road. The court does
not fault the parties for so arguing, but the court does not
believe that the entire road merits factually or legally the same
result.
11. All of this apologetic aside, this is a close and
difficult case for the court.
12.

The statute, the Dedication Statute, under which Jacob

seeks a declaration by the court that this entire loop is a
public road, states:
(1)

A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use
of the public when it has been continuously used
as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years.

(2)

The dedication and abandonment creates a rightof-way held by the state in accordance with
Sections 72-3-102, 72-3-104, 72-3-105, and 72-5-103.

(3)

The scope of the right-of-way is that which is
reasonable and necessary to ensure safe travel
according to the facts and circumstances.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-104

(2000).

13. As the Utah Supreme Court has noted in Lindsay
Livestock

v. Churnos,

285 P. 646,

Land &

the federal legislation from

1866 allowing SR 2477 roads could be viewed as an offer from the
United States of a free right of way over the public domain.
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The

enactment of Utah statutes,, as well as the common law, is the
Utah answer of how that offer has been accepted.
14.

It is clear that one who claims a public road exists

must prove the road is public and has been abandoned and
Heber

dedicated to the public by clear and convincing evidence.
v.

Simpson,

at

310.

Additionally "the burden of establishing

public use for the required period of time is on those claiming

it". Bertagnole
1981).

v.

Pine Meadow Ranches,

639 P. 2d 211,

213

(Utah

These principles guided the court in its denial of summary

judgment for Jacob wherein the court stated Jacob had an "uphill"
battle but would have to prove a public road at trial.
15. Defendants are required to show by clear and convincing
evidence that this is a public road and they claim it became such
in the time frame of 1880-1896.

That burden of proof requires

defendants to produce evidence that causes the court to have a
firm belief this is a public road. The evidence must reach the
point where there remains no substantial doubt that this is a
public road.

That is the standard the court is using to

determine if defendant has shown by clear and convincing evidence
that there has been a public road created in the time frame
alleged.

Whatever definition of "clear and convincing" is used,

that burden of proof is less than beyond a reasonable doubt.

The

court is entitled, as the finder of fact, to draw reasonable
inferences from the facts proven and found.

It is clear that one
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witness can establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt and one
witness can establish a fact by clear and convincing evidence as
well. Bonner
16.

v.

Sudbury,

417 P.2d

646

(UT.

1966).

Recently the Utah Supreme Court decided a trilogy of

cases in February 2008 which discuss the Dedication Statute and
apply to this case to some extent, though not entirely.
cases are, of course, Utah
County
2008

v.

Okelberry,

2008

County

v.

UT 10;

and

Butler,

2008

Town of

Leeds

Those

UT 12;
v.

Wasatch
Prisbey,

UT 11.
17. For purposes of this case only a few of the important

holdings have an effect.

In discussing the elements required for

a public road to be found the Court made it clear, again, that
the burden is on the claimant of a public road to prove it by
clear and convincing evidence. In Okelberry

the Court focused on

what qualifies as a sufficient interruption to restart the
running of the 10 year period and stated a bright line rule:
An overt act that is intended by a property owner to
interrupt the use of a road as a public thoroughfare,
and is reasonably calculated to do sor

constitutes

an interruption sufficient to restart the running of
the required ten-year period under the Dedication
Statute.

2008 UT 14,15.

Thus, the burden remains on Jacob to prove the road has been
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dedicated to the public continuously.

Evidence of an

interruption in that 10 year period simply precludes a finding of
continuous use.
18. From this bright-line rule it is clear to the court and
the court finds and concludes Jacob and Boyer have failed to show
this road, the entire loop, was a public road since 1941.

Haynes

and all their witnesses absolutely preclude the court from
finding by clear and convincing evidence that the gate off SR 133
was not locked at least once for a period of 10 years.

There was

a good deal of conflict in the testimony and the court need not
and did not find which "side"' is correct, but the court has
absolutely no difficulty in determining that the court is not
convinced by Jacob that since Haynes owned the Haynes property
finally in 1941 that the road was continuously used by the
public.

Indeed, Jacob in essence concedes as much.

Haynes,

through Howard Haynes Sr and others clearly locked gates and put
up signs telling people, in essence, to keep out.

Jacob did the

same on its property line, and locked a gate. Since these parties
have owned the property, at least since 1941, this has not been
dedicated as a public road.
19. Before 1941, of course, is when the Jacob parties claim
this road became public under law.

There is no genuine dispute

about any ten year period at that time as there was virtually no
compelling evidence that there were gates or fences or signs or
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anything else before that time. There was some evidence produced
by Haynes that gates were up as early as 1932, and one witness
through deposition thought a gate was in place in 1928, when
Haynes bought the east and north portions of his property, but
the court will not focus on that time period between 1932 and
1941 in any event.

The court will do as asked by Jacob and

examine and discuss the evidence as to use by the public,
continuously, before 1932.

After that time no public road was

created by public use under the Dedication Statute.
20. Turning to whether this road has been used by the public
before 1932 continuously for an uninterrupted period of ten years
requires an examination of what the "public" is.

This case

becomes more complex and somewhat unguided by past cases because
of, again, the time frame and the public nature of the land
before 1896, before statehood.
21. The recent Butler

case is helpful but not fully

determinative of an issue in this case.

The public must use the

road and it must be a public thoroughfare before a road can be
determined to be a public road under the Dedication Statute.
Butler

makes clear that those with a private right to use a road,

such as adjoining property owners or those with permission or
some prescriptive right, are not members of the public.

"People

as a whole" are considered the public, and that class includes
all trespassers, those with no right to be on the road at all.
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22. If the public used this road, meaning the entire loop,
it must be for 10 years without interruption as Okelberry
clear.

Under Butler,

makes

the ten year period need not be specified,

the period must simply be at least 10 years.
evidence, the court concludes that people

Here, based on the

(the court will discuss

whether those people amount to the "public"' using a "public
thoroughfare" later) certainly used portions of this road

(to be

discussed later) for at least 10 years, from perhaps 1865 to
1932, and certainly up to the time of statehood in 1896. The
court finds that evidence overwhelming in fact, despite its
previous doubts expressed in the court's denial of the summary
judgment motion brought by Jacob.

The court has now had the

advantage of hearing much additional evidence, more carefully
considering the documents and relating them to the property
actually viewed by the court, and having more full argument.

As

found, many, many people before 1932 used portions of this road.
There were several sawmills along various portions of the road.
There were many, many sheep that were "dipped," at corrals in the
area requiring the presence of many people. Many people hunted,
fished, and went to the lakes by some route or another.

While

the court has found the use seasonal because of the heavy
snowfall, the court concludes that the use of portions of the
road was continuous. The use of the road need not be great and
comparatively few people can use a road to make it public, but
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when the need to use a road arises and the road is used, that use
is continuous. Boyer

v.

Clark,

326 P.2d

107,

1008-109

(UT

1958).

Natural occurrences, such as flood or snow, which inhibit usage
of the road do not halt continuous use under the law. Butler,
13.

at

If the road is used as often as needed or convenient or

necessary, even though the use is not constant, it is continuous
use under the law and mere intermissions by naturally occurring
events, other than an intentional act of interruption, will not
halt the continuous nature of the use. Here, pre-1932 and
certainly pre-1896 the evidence is again overwhelming that a
large number of persons used some portion of the road for many,
many purposes on a regular and ongoing basis.
23. Those purposes are sufficient to establish a road by
whatever name.

In Boyer

the Court described the use as being use

by persons hauling coal, crossing the open range, driving cattle
and sheep, and people hunting or visiting others.
by wagon or other vehicles or horse.

The travel was

The court found that

sufficient to establish a public road.

Interestingly, that case

arose in Chalk Creek in Summit County as well in an area not far
from this East Fork drainage area.

The Court did not comment or

discuss the public nature of the domain at the time.

Trial was

in 1956 and the trial court found facts dating back 50 years, to
presumably about 1900, at or shortly after statehood.
24. In Lindsay

Livestock

v.

Churnos,
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285

P. 646

(UT.

1929)

the court dealt with a claim under the predecessor dedication
statute.

There the Court dealt with a time period from 1876 and

involved findings that the land was patented in about 1900.
There the lands were similar to these, described as unenclosed,
uninhabited mountain lands, suitable only for grazing.

Lindsay

involved sheep grazing in the summers, sawmills in 1876, as well
as a mining camp.

Persons used the road at issue in that case to

get lumber and work at and visit the mining camp, houses were
built at the campr and the use was extensive from 1876, though
the mining camp lasted only about 5 years. Since 1900 the use was
basically only sheep herders moving sheep, supplying sheep camps,
and fishermen and hunters.
road.

No public money was expended on the

The road found to be public in that case was found not to

be the identical road at the time of trial as was the previous
use but it was located in substantially the same place.

The

Court upheld the finding of a public road, again without much
comment about the public nature of the land involved.
Jeremy

25. The Court upheld the finding of a public road in
v. Bertagnole,

116 P.2d

420

(UT 1941).

Important to this case is

the characterization of the early road, from about 1869, as a
"trail" or roadway. The road was found to have been used for
trailing herds of cattle, sheep, and horses. The Court did note
that all patents issued were subject to the easements and rights
of way of the public to use all such roads as may have been
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established according to law.
26. Thus, whatever persons used this road, and the court
calls it a road, they did so continuously for over 10 years
before statehood while the lands were all in the public domain.
27. The next issue the court must discuss is just what
portion of this road was used.
focused on the entire loop.

The parties, again respectfully,

The court in its findings has

basically divided the road into four parts for its discussion:
The Bench Road across Haynes property, the Middle Fork across the
Jacob property, the Boyer road across the Boyer property, and the
East Fork Road across Haynes property going east then south from
the Bench Road.

The court does not believe the evidence merits

treating the entire road, the entire loop, identically.
28. Without yet addressing whether the use was public, the
court has found and concludes that the Bench Road and Middle
Fork, to a somewhat imprecise ending, as well as a portion of the
East Fork road to a somewhat imprecise ending, have been used by
persons continuously for over 10 years. The East Fork beyond the
middle of Section 8 T2 R8 and the Boyer Road have not been shown
by clear and convincing evidence to have been used by persons,
whether the public or not, continuously for ten years.
29. The court has found, as discussed, that the East Fork
road, based on testimony of Howard Haynes Jr, Kay Crittendon, and
the early map of 1903 (X134) demonstrate beyond doubt that Jacob
-59-

has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that a particular
route was used along the East Fork after leaving the middle of
Section 8.

That area was described as terrible passage, a rock

pile, and other terms showing it was not heavily or as regularly
used as the Bench and Middle Fork Roads. Jacob has shown that the
route along the Bench Road and Middle Fork Roads was used by
persons regularly and continuously.

The East Fork road was

described as ending in the middle of Section 8 and the early maps
show that, particularly X134 as reflected in Tab H of X296.

The

road was constructed from the middle of Section 8 for the
reservoir in about 1940, clearly not 10 years before Haynes
blocked access.

Thus, while there is some evidence people went

to the blue Lakes regularly, and some evidence that they went via
East Fork Road, the evidence is not compelling that such use was
continuous as required at least beyond the middle of Section 8.
Had it been, the East Fork Road beyond the middle of Section 8
would have shown up on early maps and it does not.
30. Contrariwise, the demonstrable depiction of the Bench
Road and Middle Fork Roads, to some point within Section 4 T2 R8,
shows a road was created and use.

It is only logical that these

two portions were used by someone or there would not be a road
shown. A passage is created by use, where timber or vegetation is
removed for ease of access. Continuous use allows the passage way
(road) to remain and be depicted on a map.
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Similarly as to the

East Fork Road to the middle of Section 8. A visible road in
1875, 1893, and on all maps thereafter, together with all the
other evidence of vast usage, shows it was from early times in at
least 1875 until statehood, used heavily by persons and that is
what made the road visible to the surveyor and that use is what
made the road visible on maps. The court's comments in its March
2007 ruling to the contrary notwithstanding, the court now having
viewed the area, the court finds and concludes that persons
traveling to the blue Lake area would certainly, at least by very
strong inference, use a road rather than cut through heavy
timber, up and over cliffs and other steep terrain. Persons
obtaining timber, for example, whether from a mill or on their
own from the woods somewhere, would use a wagon to haul the
timber and that wagon would go on this road, rather than through
the wild and over steep terrain or over fallen timber.

While

hunters may have strayed off the beaten path to find game, they
sensibly would travel the road to get to an area to hunt rather
than take off immediately through the wild terrain, even if on
horseback.

That at least is the reasonable inference the court

draws from viewing this area and considering normal and
reasonable human conduct. An inference of reasonable conduct by
persons can amount to clear and convincing evidence in this
court's view, when that inference is based on facts proven
sufficiently.

The presence of sawmills, corrals, and homesteads
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along Bench Road and Middle Fork and along the portion of the
East Fork Road to the middle of Section 8 show many persons were
regularly using this road as far back as 1875.
31. The expert report of Liapis shows that the Bench Road
and Middle Fork Road and the East Fork Road to the middle of
Section 8 are substantially the same now as when first plotted in
1875, and are certainly the same as the 1903 USGS map, X134.
32. That leads the court to the most difficult question
involved, and that is whether those persons using these Bench
Roads and Middle Fork Roads and East Fork Roads to the middle of
Section 8 and those people who "created" these roads by usage
were members of the public and whether it was a public
thoroughfare.
33. The difficult issue in this case is framed by the fact
that when these lands were used by people, the Bench Road and the
Middle Fork Road and the East Fork Road to the middle of Section
8, whoever these people were, the lands they crossed were all
public lands because they were even numbered sections, except a
small portion of Section 35 T3 R7, Section 1 T2 R7 Section 7 T2
R8, and a very small portion of T2 R8 Sections 19 and 33.

Thus,

ANYONE who used those sections, for any purpose, appears to the
court to be a member of the public.

Timber could be taken,

livestock grazed, hunting could occur, and homesteads could be
established, all without prior public approval or oversight on
-62-

the public lands.

The bulk of the Bench Road and Middle Fork

Road was on public lands as being in even numbered sections.
Only a portion of the East Fork Road is in Section 8 and most of
it is in Section 7. None of these roads crossed private land to
create a situation where another landowner now seeks to take
something away from a previous private landowner as is the case
with most of the previous court cases.

The cases where the

public road was created during the time before statehood do not
discuss this aspect of the facts in any detail but it seems of
utmost importance to this court.

The law is not developed

concerning this issue. It seems almost tautoloqical or
definitional that any use of a road
public land is a public road.
the public?

(or triai, or passage way) on

Who else did it belong to if not

It was not private and no one is seeking to now make

something public that was private previously.

Jacob in essence

is claiming what was public should remain public.
34. As to the odd number railroad sections there is no
indication in the record that the railroad ever seriously sought
to use this land, nor that any railroad ever attempted to
interfere with its use by the public on these odd numbered
sections.

Thus, while technically perhaps private land as

belonging to the railroad, the odd numbered sections were really
public as well.

It is certainly clear from the record before the

court that there is no evidence the railroad ever sought to
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exercise its rights as a landowner, during the tenure of
ownership, concerning the odd numbered sections at issue in this
case.
35. Haynes argues that use is presumed permissive but the
court believes that is particularly true when the use is by
prescription. This use is not by prescription as the use of the
road was use of a public road before Haynes owned the property
over which the road passes.
36. Even discounting that concept, however, the court finds
and concludes, based on all the evidence, that these Bench Road
and Middle Fork Road and East Fork Road to the middle of Section
8 portions were used by the public continuously for over 10 years
as a public thoroughfare.
37. The court believes Jacob's reliance on Lee
P.3d

794

(CO. App.

2001)

v.

Masner,

45

as to when homesteaders become owners is

a reasonable interpretation of the law in Utah. The court agrees
with Haynes that Kohler

v. Martin,

916 P.2d

910,

and now

Butler

and other cases make clear that property owners and invitees are
not members of the public.

However, the court does not believe

that the case relied on by Haynes, Rio
v.

Telluride,

63 P. 995

it stands for.2

(UT.

Grande

Western

Railway

Co.

1900) , stands for what Haynes claims

While these homesteaders Staley, Randall, Huff,

2

The court also does not believe a case cited by Haynes in
its pre-trial memo, Thurnwald
v. A.E. , 2007 UT 38, states at all
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and Saxton detailed in the findings above had a right to preempt
others perhaps as against their use of the property, nothing in
Utah law the court can find indicates these homesteaders are land
"owners" until at least they apply for homestead rights. Thus,
the court concludes, those homesteaders were members of the
public and it follows their guests and invitees were as well.
Moreover, the court is not basing its conclusion solely on these
homesteaders. They are merely some members of the public who used
these portions of the roads as indicated.
38. The court concludes that many members of the public,
trespassers or whatever they be called before 1896,

(and they

were trespassers after 1896 and after others owned the property,)
and all kinds of people used these sections of the Bench and
Middle Fork and East Bench Roads.

Getting lumber, game, and

recreating over the years seems never to have stopped and was
continuous for at least 10 years.

Again, a "lag" in usage,

unless the result of an intentional act of interruption, is not a
basis to conclude the road was not continuously used by the
public. Thousands and thousands of sheep came to the area and
used the Bench Road and some of the Middle Fork Road to get to
the corrals, and those thousands and thousands of sheep did not
appear only episodically.

Those thousand and thousands of sheep

what Haynes claims for it, though it is not an issue given the
court's resolution.
There can be no "taking" as the public road
is found to exist before Haynes owned the property.
-65-

did not get to the corrals or to grazing lands by themselves
under the direction of a sheep dog.

The testimony did not show

such, but again the court may rely on the common sense notion
that thousands and thousands of sheep require more than one
person to herd those sheep.

Indeed, Howard Haynes Jr described

how he helped his father and others with trailing their sheep in
the 1930s from Tooele.

From such facts the court is not amiss in

inferring many sheep herders and others were responsible for many
sheep getting to this area.

Haynes argues these facts as shown

are not evidence of continuous use.

The court has discussed that

and use is continuous if use is as needed and desired and is not
interrupted by an intentional act of the owner.

Here, the owner

of the land at the time, 1880-1896, was the public or the
railroad, and no objection was ever lodged by the railroad.
There is no evidence the railroad every did any act amounting to
an act of interruption. The use was open and the court believes
the use of the land was use of public lands on all sections.
39. Further, while neither this factor nor any one factor is
determinative, Summit County funds were expended on this road on
the Bench Road, referred to in X244 as Sage Brush Flats.

That

was in 1913, after these sections were in private ownership but
before Haynes owned the land. That too adds evidence that at
least this portion of the road was public.
40. In addition as another factor, while again not
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determinative as noted in Heber

City

v. Simpson,

at

311 n.8r

the

fact is that Summit County in 1978 determined this was a Class D
county road.

The court is fully aware that this map seems to

have been created almost immaculately as there is no evidence as
to its etiology. However, the map exists and is kept in the
County Recorder's Office and is on file with UDOT pursuant to
statute.
41. Even if not used as a public road for years as a public
road since these parties have owned the land, at least since 1941
and possibly since 1932, the public nature of the road does not
"disappear" when the land over which the public road crosses
comes into private hands.

The purchaser, Haynes and before

Haynes other owners, and Jacob and before Jacob others, all took
the property subject to the public's right to use the roads.

Sullivan,

at

957.

42. It is the totality of the evidence that convinces the
court by clear and convincing evidence these portions of the road
were used by the public continuously for at least 10 years, from
at least 1880 to 1896.
43. The burden of the usage on Haynes is not as great as if
Haynes had owned the land when this road was made public by
public use.
occurring.

Haynes frequently argued a taking of land is
As noted, this court does believe that this land was

public and the road over that public land was dedicated to the
-67-

public for such use before Haynes or Jacob purchased the land.
These owners took the land subject to the right of the public to
use the road.

Thus, it is not as if Haynes owned land, the

public then crossed it and used it, and thus Haynes is being
deprived of something he had but now has lost.

Haynes never

"had" this road, it has been public since long before he
purchased the land surrounding the public road.
44. If a road becomes public under the Dedication Statute
clearly if Haynes or Jacob anyone erects gates and posts signs
those actions do not extinguish the public nature of the road.
Sullivan

v.

Condas,

290

P. 954,

951

(UT.

1930).

This court may

not vacate a public road and the vacation of a public road may
only be done according to law. An adjoining owner of public land
may not obstruct the public right. Schettler
(UT

v. Lynch,

64 P. 955

1901).

45. As to the East Fork Road east of the middle of Section 8
the court concludes as well that there has been no public access
at least since 1941.

Prior to that time the road went to the

middle of section 8 T2 R8 as shown on the early maps, the same as
show the Bench and Middle Fork Roads.

From the middle of Section

8 going east then south the court does not believe that portion
of the road ever became public because of its much more limited
use.

The court was not and is not convinced by clear and

convincing evidence that after the usage of the road to the saw
-68-

mills in the middle of Section 8 and the "bungalows'" in that area
the use was anything other than sporadic and the route was and is
unknown. While there were some references to going that way to
the blue Lakes, the use beyond the saw mills by hunters and
fishermen and others was far more limited and not conclusive by
clear and convincing evidence that that portion of the East Fork
Road was ever abandoned and dedicated to the public.

Certainly

until about 1940 when the present iteration of the road was
constructed by the Water Users the descriptions of the area
included phrases such as rocky, a wagon trail, a terrible route,
almost unpassable, and so forth.

While such can still be a road,

the court is not convinced by clear and convincing evidence that
any particular route was traveled beyond the middle of Section 8.
To the extent it was traveled, its use was not continuous and was
at best episodic by far less members of the public than traversed
the Bench Road or Middle Fork Road or the East Fork Road to the
middle of Section 8.

The more heavy usage to Peter's Park, so

called, was before the split of the road.

The two homesteads

that were in the area were at the middle of Section 8 and were
accessed by the East Fork Road as it ended at the middle of
Section 8. The one saw mill just east of the split of the road in
Section 7 is certainly similar in character as the same features
of usage on the Bench and Middle Fork Roads.

However, the court

finds the evidence of usage simply not as convincing beyond the
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mapped ending of the East Fork Road at the middle of Section 8.
46. Thus, the court concludes that the only public road from
the early days of 1880 to 1896 and beyond until about 1932 was
what the court is calling the Bench Road, the Middle Fork Road,
and the East Fork Road to the middle of Section 8.
47. As to the remainder of what is now the East Fork Road,
however, the Jacob-Christensen entities have been given by
stipulation a prescriptive easement to use that road for
traditional purposes for which Jacob has used it in the past.
That is, for recreation and moving livestock as read into the
record at the beginning of trial.

The Jacob-Christensen family

may continue to use that East Fork Road simply for access as
agreed by Haynes but it may not be used for other purposes if
Jacob desires to in fact build additional cabins, for example.
That has not been the traditional use of that portion of the
road. The public road may be used for those reasons beyond the
stipulated prescriptive easement but the East Fork Road east of
the middle of Section 8 may be used only for pure access for the
traditional purposes.

It will also allow ingress and egress in

case of some type of emergency.

Of course, in an emergency

easements are not governing in any event.

Simply, the East Fork

Road east of the middle of Section 8 is not now and has not ever
been a public road under the Dedication Statute.
47. The court is aware that does not solve the Boyer's
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problem as to the East Fork Road.

The court does not believe

that the Boyer's have established a prescriptive easement over
the East Fork Road for at least 20 years before ownership by
Haynes.

Before statehood use by Boyers was not shown.

After

ownership of property in about 1905 the travel demonstrated by
Boyers was for purposes of going to the lakes and nothing more.
That court concludes that is not sufficient to demonstrate a
prescriptive easement for the Boyers over the entirety of East
Fork Road.

If they desire to build a cabin, as they testified,

the route to be used would have to be along the public road of
the Bench Road and Middle Fork Road. Any access the Boyers have
to their property has to be over the public road and then by
permission by Jacob.
48. That leaves the Boyer Road at issue.

The court is not

attempting to resolve any reservoir disputes, but the court has
seen no convincing evidence that at any point in time, except
recently, that the road across the Boyer Reservoir was used by
anyone.

Of all the travel to the blue Lakes for varying purposes

by the public or by the Boyers or even the Jacobs, the evidence
is not convincing that the road used went across the Boyer
Reservoir.

The court concludes that the Boyer Road is then not

the subject of being a public road nor has anyone shown a
prescriptive easement right to use the Boyer Road.

The Boyer

Road on the Boyer property is for their use and for the use of
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those they allow to use that road.

With the availability of the

public road along the Bench Road and the Middle Fork road to a
point to be discussed further below both the Jacob and Boyer
entities may use that road to the point where the public road
ends in Section 4.

Beyond that, and onto the Boyer property, the

Boyer's will have to obtain access by permission of Jacob to go
from that point to the Boyer property where the current

iteration

of the road leaves the Jacob property onto the Boyer property in
Section 34 T2 R8.
49. The court concludes, based on the testimony and again
relying heavily on X134 and X296, that the public used the Bench
and Middle Fork Roads as shown on X134 to the eastern most point
on the Jacob property where the road crosses from Tl R8 Section 4
into T2 R8 Section 33.

At that point the public road established

by the testimony from 1880 and beyond has not been shown to have
been established.

Thus, any use of the road beyond that point by

anyone will have to be permissive. The travel routes shown on
X134 and the historic usage described leads the court to find and
conclude that is the approximate point where the public gained
access to the lakes.

Beyond that lies the Boyer property line in

Section 34 from the Jacob property and the evidence does not
convince the court that any particular route was used to gain
access to the blue lakes area, and certainly there was
insufficient evidence

(if any) that the public went across the
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Boyer property and across the Boyer Reservoir.
50. Thus, the court concludes the road as it currently
exists, what the court is calling the Middle Fork Road, ends as a
public road where it crosses at the eastern most point from Tl R8
Section 4 onto T2 R8 Section 33 as now shown on X117.
Thereafter, through the Jacob property and across the Boyer
property on what the court is calling the Boyer Road, the road is
a private road and may be blocked and permission may be given or
obtained for the use of the road or any existing easement may
allow access.

The Boyer Road is private except as to any

easement in favor of the Water Users, who also enjoy a
prescriptive easement along the East Fork Road to the Boyer
property and to the Boyer Reservoir.
51. Thus, to summarize, the court, from the evidence,
concludes that the East Fork Road is a public road from the point
in Section 7 T2 R8 where it splits from the Bench Road to the
middle of Section 8. From that point the East Fork Road is
private.

Jacob enjoys a historic easement along that road from

the middle of Section 8 only for access as historically used.
The Boyers do not enjoy a similar prescriptive easement for the
same purposes. The Water Users enjoy a prescriptive easement
along that road as well as Jacob but only as necessary for its
purposes.

Where that East Fork Road joins onto the Boyer

property at the tri-junction of the Haynes, Jacob and Boyer
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properties, at the junction of T2 R8 Sections 34 and Section 27,
the road remains private through the Boyer property in Section 34
and it remains private until, going southerly, it enters the
Jacob property at the eastern most portion of the division of
Sections 33 T2 R8 and Section 4 Tl R8. The Water Users enjoy a
prescriptive easement on the Boyer Road and any other use by
others is permissive. The road is then public back to SR 133 from
the Jacob property going along the Middle Fork and Bench Roads.
Boyer does not enjoy a prescriptive easement from its property to
the point the pubic road begins and any access will have to be by
permission of Jacob.
In an attempt to again clarify, BASICALLY as shown on X117,
the court is concluding, with the slight adjustments noted above,
that as shown on X117, Section A so labeled is public, Section C
is private, and Section D is private subject to the easements
described. Section B is public.
52. One of the arguments Haynes has made against any portion
of the road being declared public is that it goes "nowhere/'
there is no destination, it does not lead to a public place or
even a particular site.

That has indeed caused the court some

concern throughout this litigation. In fact the court is aware of
a few cases cited by the parties that deal with a "dead end" as a
public road. In Renfro

v McCowan,

2006

Dist.

LEXIS

84439,

the

road found to be public went to a "view" area as described by the
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court. In Bertagnole

1981),

v.

Pine

Meadow Ranches,

639 P. 2d 211

f

(UT.

the road seems to go to many, many cabins, but it does not

lead to some other public area and when a member of the public
gets to the "end" the same route, with lots of possible branches
and loops, must be taken to return to 1-80. Thus, the road in
that case seems to be similar to the public aspects of this road,
Bertagnole

it leads to a "dead end" with some more loops in the
road up Tolgate Canyon.

The court concludes that such a

"nowhere" road may still be a public road.

The public may drive

this road from SR 133 on either branch, along the East Fork Road
to the middle of section 8, or along the Bench and Middle Fork
Roads to Section 4, view the surroundings and turn around and
travel back the same route as they took to SR 133.

That is the

nature of public roads under these Dedication Statutes based on
older federal law which allowed creation of such roads. The fact
that the public aspect of this road leads to a "dead end" as far
as an actual destination does not defeat the public nature of its
creation.
53. As to the width and scope of the public road it has been
noted, in Bertagnole

at 213,

that the width of a dedicated

highway is not limited to the beaten path.

The width of a public

road is to be determined as a question of fact.
The Pinecrest

Water

Company,

909 P.2d

cited for that proposition, Blonquist
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225

Butler

(UT 1995).

v. Blonquist,

et.al.

v.

In the case
516 P.2d

343

(UT. 1973),

the court upheld a finding, without much discussion,

of a width of 44 feet as being necessary and reasonable under the
circumstances based upon the uses made of the road.

The width

which is reasonably safe and convenient for which the road was
put is the width to be declared. In Memmott
(UT. 1982),

v.

Anderson,

642

750

the trial court declared a public road a certain

width and the Supreme Court found it was unable to determine what
basis was used to determine the declared width.

Bertagnole

categorized, at 213-214, some past cases involving mountain
canyons, and discussed findings of 44 feet, 60 and 82.5 feet in
varying parts, 49.5 feet and 100 feet. The court in Jeremy v.
Bertagnole,

116 P.2d

420

(UT 1941)

discussed a public road

created similarly to this case. That case made clear the width of
the road is not to be measured by the width of the beaten track.
It was necessary for the court to determine, according to what
was reasonable and necessary, under all the facts and
circumstances, the proper width and "where the public have
acquired the right to a public highway by user, they are

[not]

limited to such width as has actually been used by them." That
court noted that generally the greater portion of travel on a
county road is confined to the tracks made by vehicles, but there
must bee room enough for travelers to pass each other. The road
must be kept in such condition that the public will be safe and
their rights protected.

That court was citing Lindsay

-76-

Land

which

had indicated that the declared 100 foot width was justified by
the evidence which showed more than that had probably been used.
That case also stated, however, that the court must fix a width
according to what was reasonable and necessary, under all the
facts and circumstances, "for the uses which were made of the
road." The court in Jeremy

went on to say the court could not

turn a bridle path abandoned to the public into a boulevard.

"On

the other hand, the implied dedication of a roadway to automobile
traffic is the dedication of a roadway of sufficient width for
safe and convenient use thereof by such traffic."
54. These cases do not clearly answer the question for the
court for a number of reasons.

First, the cases seem to refer,

on one hand, to what "was" the use.
especially in Jeremy,

On the other hand,

the courts discuss what "is" necessary now

that the road is declared public for the safety of those "now"
using the road. The Court has pointed out, in Butler
id,

v

Pinecrest,

that it was not error for the court to fail to determine

width when that was not the focus of the litigation.

Secondly,

none of the cases refer to any statutes which state public
policy.
55. In this case the court in its own defense must comment
on how this issue was raised.

During the trial there was

precious little by way of evidence presented concerning the width
of any portion of this road.

The only direct evidence was from
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Grant MacFarlane, who testified that at the lower, or northernmost portions of the Bench Road, that the road was perhaps an
average of 20 feet wide there.

There was evidence from Haynes

that the road was in places only 8 feet wide and vegetation had
to be cut in the Spring as it had grown over the space of the
road when Haynes was a young man.

The testimony did not reveal

any specific places where that occurred or how wide the road was
at any particular place nor how wide on average the road was.
Jacob, to the court's recollection, did not present any evidence
directly as to the road width at any point along the entire loop.
There was some evidence that the road across the Boyer Reservoir
was 12 feet. The court, as noted, traveled the entire loop in
October 2007 with counsel. The court was unaware the issue of
width may arise specifically, and in fact it was hardly mentioned
during trial except in closing argument and in one post-trial
brief. It was not mentioned in pre-trial briefs. It was first
mentioned in the trial in Jacob's closing argument, then Haynes
responded and Haynes responded in its post-trial brief. During
the field trip the court did not pay particular attention to the
width of the road.

However, from that field trip alone the court

would simply find and conclude that the width of the road seemed
to vary greatly from the court's observations from one point to
the next.
seemed

It indeed seemed as narrow as 8 feet in places and it

wider than 20 feet in others.

At the very base in the
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northern most portions of the Bench Road testimony showed the oil
and gas companies expanded the road in the 1980s but the exact
beginning and ending of that widening was not revealed. Thus,
respectfully, the court is operating under somewhat of a
disadvantage.

No party referred to any statutes whatever.

55. Most recently, in fact on March 18, 2008, the Utah
Supreme Court decided Pearson

v.

Pearson,

2008

UT 24.

In her

dissenting opinion Chief Justice Durham noted that the courts are
to examine statutory public policy before turning to common law.
In this instance a statute and the case law seem to conflict to
this court's thinking, though again no party briefed the specific
issues.
56. UCA 72-5-108 seems to provide a stated legislative
police that the "width" of rights of way for public highways
shall be set as the highway authority of the State or county may
determine for highways under their respective jurisdiction. This
has been declared by Summit County in 1978 a Class D county road
and it has now been declared, as described herein, a public road
by this court.

It would thus seem under that statute that the

county, Summit County, determines the width.

The "scope" of the

right of way is that which is reasonable and necessary to ensure
safe travel according to the facts and circumstances. UCA 72-5104.

Thus, to this court these statutes indicate, despite the

cases to the contrary, that the court need not declare a width as
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the court defers to the county authority to determine width. The
cases that upheld the trial court's determination of width did
not refer to UCA 72-5-108 or its predecessors, UCA 27-12-93,
which have seemingly been in effect since 1963. The court, based
on that statute, believes that the determination of width is NOT
for the court but for county authorities. The

determination of

the width appears to be the responsibility of the county if this
remains a Class D road.
57. From these thoughts and recitation of the law the court
is of the belief that it ought not to declare a width.

However,

if the court's reading of the above statute is wrong, the court
offers these thoughts and conclusions so that the parties need
not return to court in the event the county either vacates this
road or does not believe it is the responsibility of the county
to declare the width of such a road or highway.
58. The court believes that it is attempting to solve a
problem, not merely "find" the law though that is its principle
task.

The evidence showed that Jacob had a crane, cement trucks,

front end loaders, caterpillars, road graders, pipe hauling
trucks, 10 wheel dump trucks, media broadcast trucks, and other
large vehicles on the Bench and Middle Fork Roads.

Those

vehicles seemed to have made it to what the court has concluded
is the end of the public road without altering the road in its
public portions. Evidently all construction equipment went along
-80''". i ' J /. "/ 7

the Bench and Middle Fork roads and not on the East Fork Road.
The historic use by wagon and foot and horse indeed would require
much less width in a road normally.

The court has not in any way

focused on the "trailing right'7 easements contained in X7 and X8
for example, whereby a 100 foot easement along the road was given
for trailing and moving sheep.

The court believes the language

of the cases does not restrict the court to the historic uses
only, but the court may and does consider what will now be safe
for the public who may use that road if in fact it is the court's
responsibility to declare a width.

Again, the cases seem to say

it is the court's responsibility but to this court the statute
seems to say otherwise.

If the court is responsible to declare a

width the court believes the evidence and law allow the court to
declare the road should be 18 feet in width.

That is a far cry

from that requested by Jacob but given that they have built 3
cabins and at least part of a fourth cabin at the southern end of
this now-public road, and given that there may well be greater
vehicle traffic now that the public may visit the area, and given
the safety concerns involved in vehicles passing each other, it
seems to the court a modest change will be required but this will
still allow what the court concludes is reasonable and necessary
and convenient for what uses are likely to be made of this public
road. This will allow two vehicles to pass each other.
59. Again, the court's view is that the common law of Utah
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allows the court to declare a width, but the statutory law
reflecting public policy requires the county to declare the
width.

The court defers to the county but if the court is wrong,

rather than return to court, the above conclusions are the
court's view on the matter.
60. Haynes' contention that this "road widening" could
amount to a taking is rejected. Again, this public road was
actually created long before Haynes purchased the property and
Haynes took the property subject to the public's right of usage.
The court is now merely determining, if it must, what that usage
is as far as being reasonably necessary and convenient to the
public today.

A width such that two vehicles can pass each other

is deemed by the court to be reasonable and proper.
61. As to the width of the East Fork Road, the court
believes no evidence justifies any conclusion other than that the
width should remain just as it is presently on the non-public
portion.

The public portion is subject to the above comments.

That historical use on the private road amounted to less use than
the public portion, it is used less in the modern time, and is a
private road with limited prescriptive use by only the Jacob and
the Water User entities.

Boyer can, of course, fully access

their property via the public road and so there is no need nor
justification for any other determination as to the East Fork
Road east of the middle of Section 8.

That is also true of the
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Boyer Road.
62. The court does not believe the litigation initiated by
Haynes was in bad faith. It is a most difficult case for the
court and the court sees no bad faith on behalf of any party
though the court does wonder why the concessions given by Haynes
were not announced 10 years ago. It appears true Haynes has not
really attempted to stop the Jacob entities from use of the loop
road, but Haynes for some reason believes Boyer has no access.
Haynes is wrong, but not in bad faith for so believing.
63. Similarly, the court concludes there are no damages for
any trespass Haynes has caused by interfering with right of
access.

No evidence was presented on any such damages in any

event.
Defendant is to prepare an order in compliance with URCP,
Rule 7(f) setting forth this ruling. THIS MEMORANDUM DECISION IS
INCORPORATED INTO ANY PREPARED ORDER AND THIS DECISION IS
CONSIDERED AS PART OF THE COURT'S FINAL ORDER.
DATED this

day of . / / W .

, 2008,

BY THE COURT:

BRUCE C. LUBECK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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APPENDIX B
RULING and ORDER, August 29, 2008, H.R. 001678-001692

IN THE D I S T R I C T COURT OF THE THIRD J U D I C I A L DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK, LLC,
et a l . ,
Defendant.
JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK, LLC,
et a l . ,

Counterclaim
Plaintiffs,
vs.
HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK
COMPANY, et al.,
Counterclaim
Defendants.
TRIPLE H. RANCH, LC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FERN J. BOYER et al.,
Defendants and
Third Party
Plaintiffs,
vs.
HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK
COMPANY, et al. ,
Third-Party
Defendants.

RULING and ORDER
Case No. 980600244
[Consolidating Case Nos.
00600299 and 980600244]
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK
DATE: August 29, 2008

The above matter came before the court on August 26, 2008
for oral argument on various motions and requests.

Haynes was present through Ray G. Martineau and Leslie W.
Slaugh; Jacob was present through Clark Waddoups, Jonathan 0.
Hafen, and Tobi D. Potestio; Boyer was present through Brent A.
Bohman; Summit County was present through Jami R. Brackin, and
the State of Utah was present through Steven G. Schwendiman.

Discussion was held on the following: Jacob Family Chalk
Creek, LLC, Catherine B. Christensen, LLC, and Brian Garff's
(Jacob) Motion for Entry of Proposed Form of the Order and in the
alternative to Reopen Evidence for Limited Purpose; Haynes Land &
Livestock Company, Triple H. Ranch, LC, and Chalk CreekHoytsville Water Users Corporation's (Haynes) Motion for
Reconsideration of Road Width; and Fern Boyer, Gerald G. Boyer,
Gregory J. Boyer, and J.S. Hansen's (Boyer) Motion for
Reconsideration, or in the Alternative, for Clarification.
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Jacob filed their motion on May 15, 2008.
opposition memorandum on May 21, 2008.
memorandum on June 9, 2008.

Jacob on June 17, 2008.

Jacob filed a reply

Haynes filed their motion for

reconsideration on May 21, 2008.
memorandum on June 9, 2008.

Haynes filed an

Jacob filed an opposition

A request to submit was filed by

Based thereon oral argument was

scheduled. That was postponed as Boyer filed their motion for
reconsideration on July 30, 2008.

Haynes filed a memorandum in

opposition and Boyer filed a reply and request to submit for
decision the same day. The court scheduled argument on all
motions for August 26, 2008.

Oral argument was held and the court took the issues under
advisement. Before the hearing the court carefully considered the
memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties.

Since

taking the issues under advisement, the court has further
considered the law and facts relating to the issues. The court
has further reviewed the trial proceedings and relevant exhibits.
Now being fully advised, the court renders the following Ruling
and Order.

-3-

BACKGROUND
The background for this case was set forth in the Court's
prior memorandum decision of March 21, 2008.

ARGUMENTS
Jacob moves for entry of their proposed form of order and
final judgment and alternatively to reopen evidence for the
limited purpose of addressing the issue of the road's width. A
newer version of a proposed order was provided at argument.
Jacob's proposed order differs from the decision of the court in
some respects.

First, they request the order be modified to show

they do not have a prescriptive easement on the East Fork road.
Second, they requested but withdrew at oral argument that the
order be modified to state the road is 36 feet wide for "safety
and maintenance" purposes instead of the court's 18 foot
determination.
Jacob, after reviewing the tape of the trial record,
suggests that Haynes only stipulated that Jacob had a
prescriptive easement across the Bench road.
Jacob agrees that Summit County should determine the width
of the road.
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Haynes argues in their opposition memorandum that the road
should not be expanded beyond the 18 foot declaration and that
the court should not reopen evidence on the issue of road width.
Haynes claims that testimony set the traveled surface of the road
at only eight feet.
width.

Eighteen feet would be more than twice that

Haynes says the court found the existing road sufficient

for travel by large trucks and equipment.

Further, Haynes denies

that the Summit County Development Code, upon which Jacob relies,
is controlling and that the recommendation contained therein
pertains to subdivisions only.

Haynes argues that the "Rights-

of-way Across Federal Lands Act" upon which Jacob relies is not
applicable because it was not enacted until after this lawsuit
commenced.

Haynes cites Western
No. 1 v. Jackson

Cattle

Kane County
Co.,

Special

744 P.2d 1376,

Service
1377

(Utah

District
1987)

which upheld the determination that a road should be 10 feet wide
while noting it was of such width during its public use.

Haynes

argues that there is no evidence that the road in its present
condition is not safe.
Haynes contends that to reopen evidence now on the issue of
road width would cause them prejudice, be unfair, and would
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unnecessarily delay proceedings.

In reply Jacob again asserts that Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-108
supports a statutorily prescribed road width to be determined by
Summit County.

Summit County joins that position.

Jacob cites Hunsaker

v. State,

509 P.2d

352,

354

(Utah

1973)

to show the Utah Supreme Court in determining the width of a road
started with a statutory presumption and then looked to
potentially rebutting evidence.
Bertagnole,

116 P.2d

420,

424

Jacob asserts, quoting Jeremy

(Utah

1941),

v.

that any established

use should be continually possible in a safe and convenient
manner.

Haynes objects to certain portions of the proposed order
submitted by Jacob.

Haynes points to Rule 7(f)(3), URCP, to

support its assertion that the order should not include a
reference to incorporating the court's memorandum decision.
Haynes agrees with Jacob that the order should reflect that
Jacob has a right to use the Bench road, but not the East Fork
road.
Haynes contends the boundary between the Haynes and Boyer
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properties is at the boundary of sections 27 and 34, not "in"
section 34 itself.
Haynes objects to making the road 36 feet wide and insists
it should remain at 18 feet as originally determined by the
court. Haynes argues Summit County should not determine the width
of the road but the court must do so.
Haynes assert the Boyer Defendants' easement denial was a
denial of all types of easement, not just prescriptive.
Haynes asserts the order should state that all other claims
of access by Jacob are denied.
Finally, Haynes asserts that the order should say the Jacob
claim for easement is denied instead of not reached.

Jacob objects to the proposed order of Haynes.
Jacob asserts there is a significant difference in denying
its claim and not reaching it and the language of the order
should be the claim was not reached.

This would enable an

appellate court to remand with Jacob retaining access to its
property.

If the claim was denied and the appellate court

reversed the decision that the road is public, Jacob is denied
access to its property.
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Boyer argues that the Court has decided without elaboration
that they do not have a prescriptive right to use the East Fork
road to access their property and that Water Users have a
prescriptive easement across their property. Boyer argues the
court misapprehended their argument as to when the prescriptive
easement was acquired-

Haynes did not even know Boyer had an

interest in the Boyer property until long after the twenty-year
period was over.

Evidence that a key was given to the gate does

not mean the use was permissive.
Boyer recites from the courts memorandum decision that Gary
and Greg Boyer have used the road for more than the 20-year
prescriptive easement period.

They assert their use was not

permissive and there was never any interruption of the use.
Boyer argues the Water Users never asserted a claim for a
prescriptive right of way across the Boyer property and never
presented any evidence to that effect.

Boyer therefore claim

there is no legal basis for granting such a right of way.

In opposition Haynes asserts no road existed during the time
Boyer claims prescriptive use.

Haynes maintains that the key
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given by Howard Haynes, Sr. granted permission to use the road
and thus the use could not be adverse.

By locking the gate,

Haynes interrupted the statutory period for a prescriptive
easement.
Haynes also asserts that the Water Users claims were tried
by consent.

Since there was no objection to the evidence on the

matter, it would be a waste of resources to try the issue again
separately.

Boyer in reply again maintains its use of the road was
adverse, that provision of a key to the gate does not rebut the
presumption of adversity, that the Okelberry

case does not apply,

that their use of the road was not under the claim of JacobChristensen, and that Water Users have not presented any evidence
to support a prescriptive easement.

DISCUSSION
The court has fully considered the positions of the parties
and again reviewed the relevant portions of the file and exhibits
and reviewed the necessary parts of the file.
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1. Road width
The court believes its memorandum decision was correct.
Under UCA 72-5-108 the relevant highway authority considers the
factors set forth by statute in that chapter 5 of Title 72.

The

court's comments as to its "feelings" were in essence dicta and
thoughts as the court ruled and reaffirms that the decision as to
the width of a public road belongs to Summit County.

This court

is not "delegating" the decision to a governmental entity as the
legislature has done that. The court believes not only does the
statute make that clear but policy does as well.

Summit County

is certainly able to conduct hearings and consider input and
exercise its expertise in a more meaningful manner than is the
court on such issues as what is reasonable and necessary for
safety of the public.
Haynes arguments as to the "taking" are again rejected.

The

court determined previously and reaffirms that Haynes never had
something to take.

This road was public before Haynes bought the

property and Haynes accepted and took the property subject to
that public right. Further, there has been no taking at this
point in any event.
The court DENIES Haynes motion for reconsideration.

Thus,

-10Jo lOo

/

the court will sign an order in the language of paragraph 12 of
the order provided to the court August 26, 2008.

2. Boyer's motion to reconsider or clarify.
The court will not change or modify its final conclusion
about Boyer's not having any type of easement along the East Fork
road.

The court does not believe any further findings are

necessary as the court found any use was permissive.

The only

reasonable explanation for having a locked gate and advising
someone of where a key can be found to open that gate is that the
use was permissive.

Thus, the court will clarify to the extent

needed that the court found and concludes that any use by the
Boyers since ownership by Haynes has been permissive and thus
there can be no prescriptive easement.
The court does not determine that the bright-line principles
of Okelberry

govern in this situation but the court does conclude

the reasoning of that case applies as well to a prescriptive
easement situation.

Where a gate is erected, whether over a

public road or otherwise, that is a clear interruption of the
allowed use, whether it be a public road or use under a
prescriptive easement.

Haynes intent is clear here since
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ownership and the gate along the East Fork was intended to keep
people out.

Again, use by the Boyers was permissive and thus the

court's conclusion that they have no right of prescriptive
easement use remains the court's ruling.
The court believes its conclusion as to the easement of the
Water Users is also justified by the court's findings as well and
no modification of that ruling or clarification is granted.
Boyer's motion to reconsider is DENIED.

The court has carefully examined the proposed order given
to the court August 26, 2008, and has considered the comments and
arguments of the parties as to that order.

The court directs

Jacob-Christensen to prepare a final order in that same form and
content but adding paragraph 21 from Haynes's proposed order
dealing with the private nature of the Water User's road.
The court will then sign that final order which is again to
incorporate fully the court March 21, 2008, memorandum decision
as well as this brief clarification to the court's denial of
Boyer's claim of prescriptive easement over the East Fork Road.

The court believes its memorandum decision of March 21,
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2008, was correct and reaffirms it in all aspects other than as
indicated in the order the court will sign.

DATED this

I day of

, 2008.

BY THE COURT:
/

BRUCE C. LUBECK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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APPENDIX C
ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT, September 16, 2008, H.R. 001693-001700 with Ex. A

Clark Waddoups (3975)
Jonathan 0. Hafen (6096)
Tobi D. Potestio (9557)
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750
Attorneys for Jacob Family Chalk Creek,
LLC; Catherine B. Christensen, L.L.C.;
and Brian Garff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

\
:
)
1

VS.

;

JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK, LLC,
et al.,

\
:

Defendants.

JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK, LLC,
et al.,
Counterclaim Plaintiffs,
vs.

;

ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT

1

Civil No. 980600244

\
:,
'
!
'

[Consolidating Case Nos. 00600299
and 980600244]
Judge: Bruce C. Lubeck

HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK
COMPANY, et al.,
Counterclaim Defendants.

TRIPLE H. RANCH, LC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FERN J. BOYER et al,
Defendants and
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK
COMPANY, et al.
Third-Party Defendants.

The above-captioned matter came on for trial before the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck on
March 4, 5,6,7, and 11,2008. The Court took the matter under advisement at the conclusion of the
trial and on March 21,2008 issued a Memorandum Decision in which the Court set forth its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On
August 26, 2008, the Court heard oral argument on various motions and requests pertaining to the
Memorandum Decision. After taking the additional matters under advisement, the Court issued a
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Ruling and Order on August 29, 2008. For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Decision, the
Ruling and Order, and for good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The Memorandum Decision of the Court, dated March 21,2008, and the Ruling and

Order of the Court, dated August 29, 2008, are incorporated into this Order and are considered as
part of the Court's Final Order.
2.

Jacob Family Chalk Creek, LLC, Catherine B. Christensen, LLC, and Brian Garff s

(collectively, "Jacob-Christensen") declaratory action seeking judgment that the road at issue in this
dispute (the "Road") is a public right of way is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:
A.

Pursuant to "R.S. 2477," Act of July 26,1866, ch. 262, § 8,14 Stat. 251,253,
codified at 43 U.S.C. § 932, repealed by Federal Land Policy Management
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579 § 706(a), 90 Stat. 2743, the Road is apublic
way as it traverses through every even numbered se ction specified in
Paragraphs 3 through 5 below.

B.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 (2007), the Road is a public way as
it traverses through every odd numbered section specified in Paragraphs 3
through 5 below.

C.

The Road is a private way as it traverses through the sections or portions of
sections specified in Paragraphs 6, 7, 8, and 9 below.
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3.

From where the Road forks off of State Road 133 approximately eighteen miles east

of Coalville, Summit County, Utah and travels in a southeasterly direction along the East Fork of
Chalk Creek through Sections 35 and 36 of Township 3 North, Range 7 East; Section 1 of
Township 2 North, Range 7 East; and Sections 6, 7, and 18 of Township 2 North, Range 8 East the
Road is a public way ("Bench Road").
4.

From where the Bench Road ends and the Road travels through Sections 19, 20, 29,

32, and 33 of Township 2 North, Range 8 East; and Section 4 of Township 1 North, Range 8 East
the Road is a public way until the eastern most point where the Road crosses back from Township 1
North, Range 8 East, Section 4 into Township 2, Range 8 East, Section 33.
5.

From where the Road forks off of the Bench Road in Section 7 of Township 2 North,

Range 8 East and travels in an easterly direction through Sections 7 and 8 of Township 2 North,
Range 8 East, the Road is a public way through the west half of Section 8 in the township until it
reaches the center line.
6.

The portion of the Road beginning at the center line of Section 8, Township 2 North,

Range 8 East and traveling through the east half of Section 8 and Sections 9,15, 16, 22, 23, 26, and
27 (to the boundary between Sections 27 and 34) of Township 2 North, Range 8 East is not a public
road.
7.

The portion of the Road described in Paragraphs 5 and 6 above is collectively referred

to as the "East Fork Road." The East Fork Road ends in Section 34, Township 2 North, Range 8
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East where the property of Fern Boyer, Gerald Boyer, Gregory Boyer, Alfred Blonquist as Trustee
(collectively "Boyer Defendants"), and Triple H Ranch LC begins at its north boundary line.
8.

The portion of Road that traverses the property of the Boyer Defendants and Triple H

Ranch LC in Section 34 of Township 2 North, Range 8 East is a private way and shall be referred
to herein as the "Boyer Road."
9.

The portion of the Road beginning at the eastern most point where it crosses between

Township 1 North, Range 8 East, Section 4 and Township 2 North, Range 8 East, Section 33 until
it reaches the Boyer Road is a private way.
10.

The portion of the Road described in Paragraphs 4 and 9 above is collectively referred

to as the "Middle Fork Road."
11.

The course of the Road stated in Paragraphs 3 through 10 above is depicted on the

map introduced as trial Exhibit 117, which is attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein
by this reference.
12.

The width of the portions of the Road that have been declared a public way shall be

determined by Summit County, Utah according to that which is reasonable and necessary to ensure
safe travel based on the facts and circumstances.
13.

The Chalk-Creek Hoytsville Water Users Corporation have a prescriptive easement

for ingress and egress over the Boyer Road only for purposes of operating and maintaining Joyce
Lake and Boyer Lake reservoirs.
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14.

The Boyer Defendants' claim for an easement over the East Fork Road is

15.

Haynes Land & Livestock Company's ("Haynes") claim that a taking has occurred

DENIED.

is DENIED.

16.

Haynes' claims to quiet title in the Road as against the Jacob-Christensens

individually and collectively are DENIED for the portions of the Bench, East Fork, and Middle Fork
Roads that are public as described above.
17.

Haynes' claims to quiet title in the Road as against the Jacob-Christensens

individually and collectively are GRANTED for the portion of the East Fork Road that is not a public
way, as described above, based on a stipulation between Haynes and Jacob-Christensen after the
Memorandum Decision issued whereby the parties agreed Jacob-Christensen does not have a
prescriptive easement across the private portion of the East Fork Road.
18.

Jacob-Christensen's claim for damages due to trespass by Haynes is DENIED.

19.

Jacob-Christensen's claim for easement by grant, easement by necessity, and

prescriptive easement on the Bench Road are not reached based on the Court's ruling that the Bench
Road is a public way.
20.

Default judgment is hereby entered against B.A. Bingham & Sons, LLC, a limited

liability company; David B. Williams, an individual; Stillman Seven, a partnership; Karel J. Snyder,
an individual, Helen W. Blonquist, an individual, Barbara Hall, an individual, and Kevin Hall, an
individual.

-64

ilQlbSS

21.

That portion of the road over the property of Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users

Corporation in Section 34, Township 2 North, Range 8 East is a private road and no party has
established any easement or other right of access for the use of that road.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, there being no just reason for delay, pursuant to
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this judgment is entered as a final judgment and
immediate execution may be had and issued on this final judgment.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT ENTERED this / S _ day of September, 2008.
B Y THE COURT:

Honorable Bruce C. Lubecfc, *o$sm&y^*
Utah District Court Judge ^ ' V ^ S ^
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this Q

day of September, 2008,1 caused a true and correct copy

of the foregoing ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT to be served via first class, U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid upon the following:

Ray G. Martineau, Esq.
Anthony R. Martineau, Esq.
Brett D. Cragun, Esq.

David L. Thomas, Esq.
Jami R. Brackin, Esq.

MARTINEAU LAW

3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, UT 84106

60 North Main
P.O. Box 128
Coalville, UT 84017

Leslie W. Slaugh, Esq.

Timothy W. Blackburn, Esq.

HOWARD LEWIS & PETERSEN

VAN COTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

120 East 300 North
Provo,UT 84606

2404 Washington Boulevard
Ogden,UT 84401

Stephen G. Schwendiman, Esq.
Norman K. Johnson, Esq.
Julie I. Valdes, Esq.

Paul R. Poulsen, Esq.

ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL

1594 West North Temple, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84116

SUMMIT COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

TESCH LAW OFFICES, PC

314 Main Street, Suite 200
P.O. Box 3390
Park City, UT 84060

Brent A. Bohman, Esq.
157 North Commercial Street, Suite 3
P.O. Box 120
Morgan, UT 84050
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APPENDIX D
Summit County Map of properties, Exhibit 117

Ci immit C*r\\

int\/

C O M M ERCE
F U U SEKVICE C O H « a i C , A l « A l ESTATE
1 7 5 East 4 0 0 South. Suite 7 0 0

K***************
c o a ^ c e C R C ^ S S ^ S
Aaial Photography; 2006
The*ovehfamarimwNlenotaj*anteedlia>

APPENDIX E
LEGEND TO POINTS ON TRIAL EXHIBIT 117

LEGEND TO POINTS ON TRIAL EXHIBIT 117

A.

Section 7

Old Saw

B.

Section 8

Huff Homestead

C.

Section 8

Saxton Homestead

D.

Section 10

Corral

E.

Section 18

Staley Homestead

F.

Section 18

Randall Homestead

G.

Section 18

Irrigated Field

H.

Section 20

Cabin/John Clark

I.

Section 20

Old Saw Mill

J.

Section 20

Clark's Dipping Corral

K.

Section 4

Cabin

APPENDIX F
Transfer of Titles of Relevant Sections, from the U.S. Government to New Owners

Section

Date Federal Gov't Transferred

New Owner

Sec 35, T3N, R7E

January 8, 1869

Union Pacific Railroad

Sec 36, T3N, R7E

January 4, 1896

State of Utah

Sec 1,T2N, R7E

January 8, 1869

Union Pacific Railroad

Sec 6, T2N, R8E
(Lots, 5, 6, and 7)

May 26, 1903

State of Utah

Sec 7, T2N, R8E

January 8, 1869

Union Pacific Railioad

Sec 8, T2N, R8E
(SWAofNWA)

September 6, 1901

State of Utah

Sec 8, T2N, R8E

Febiuaiy2, 1901

State of Utah

Sec 8, I2N, R8E
(N'/2 of SE% and NVi of SWA)

December 14, 1895

George Huff
(homestead)

Sec 8, T2N, R8E
(S!/2 of SE% and S'/2 of SW%)

May 20, 1896

Charles Saxton
(homestead)

Sec 18, T2N, R8E
(Lots l ^ a n d E ^ o f N W 1 / , )

December 26, 1895

William Staley
(homestead)

Sec 18, T2N, R8E
(Lots 3, 4 and EVi of SWA)

Febiuary 17, 1896

LW Randall
(homestead)

Sec 18,T2N, R8E
(W/2ofSE]A)

June 5, 1909

State of Utah

Sec 18, T2N, R8E
(SE'/.ofSE1/,)

August 29, 1900

State of Utah

Sec 19, T2N, R8E

January 8, 1869

Union Pacific Railroad

Sec 20, T2N, R8E

Decembei 19, 1899

State of Utah

Sec 20, T2N, R8E
(Remamdei of section)

Decembei 7, 1906

State of Utah

Sec 29,12N, R8E

January 8, 1869

Union Pacific Railroad

Sec 32, T2N, R8E

January 4, 1896

State of Utah

Sec 33, T2N, R8E

January 8, 1869

Union Pacific Railroad

Sec 4, TIN, R8E
(Lot 3)

July 27, 1899

State of Utah

(SE'/4 of NW'/t)

(NW/4 ofNW/4)

